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NOVEMBER 1977

Military Implications of a Possible World Order Crisis in the 1980s

Guy J. Pauker



A Project AIR FORCE report
prepared for the
United States Air Force

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This study attempts

An attempt to discern trends that may make the international environment of the 1980s different from that of the recent past and to draw conclusions concerning the military implications of those trends. The author suggests that mankind may be entering a period of increased social instability and faces the possibility of a breakdown of the global order as a result of the sharpening confrontation between the Third World and the industrial democracies and as a result of a "system overload" caused by population growth, incessant demand for energy and other natural resources, and the incapacity of obsolete forms of government to deal with the complexities of today's civilization. Because there is no precedent for U.S. military planners, it might be useful to develop doctrine, plans, weapons, and force structures suitable for the protection of U.S. interests in what could turn out to be, in the 1980s, a period of chaos and anarchy. (JDD)

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
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PREFACE

Conducted under Project AIR FORCE (formerly Project RAND) auspices, this study matured slowly because of the difficulty inherent in an attempt to discern new trends that would make the international environment of the 1980s different from that of the decades since World War II. The attempt to draw conclusions concerning the military implications of possible future events that can only be imagined in sketchy outline compounded the requirement for slow and careful reflection. The present report--prepared under the project "Major Forces Shaping the Air Force Issues of the 1980s"--is the outcome of those efforts.

The purpose of the report is to stimulate debate on a question that has been looming in the background of discussions concerning North-South relations since the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974: If the United States should find itself compelled to use force or the threat of force to protect vital national interests jeopardized by Third World countries, could such a policy be implemented effectively?

It is suggested here that--setting aside obvious political and moral constraints against a relapse into the practices of the age of "gunboat diplomacy"--it is problematic whether doctrines are available which would guide the efficient use of military power in the technologically sophisticated defense environment likely to prevail in the Third World in the 1980s.



SUMMARY

The Department of Defense uses "contingency analysis" as a method of determining U.S. force needs. The contingencies to which most attention is given in considering the design of U.S. general purpose forces are selected from those areas of international tension that have produced crises in the past. But in the coming decade, new sources of turbulence may generate additional, perhaps even more urgent, requirements from U.S. military forces.

The *Annual Defense Department Report FY1978* specifies explicitly that contingency analysis "is not useful, and is not intended to be useful, as a forecast of where, when, or how the United States would or should use the resulting capabilities." It is an "aggregate method of determining U.S. force needs." This essay was written as a contribution to contingency analysis. It discusses broad trends discernible at present and their possible military implications, not specific situations that might concern decisionmakers in the coming decade but which cannot be anticipated years in advance.

There is a non-negligible chance that mankind is entering a period of increased social instability and faces the possibility of a breakdown of global order as a result of a sharpening confrontation between the Third World and the industrial democracies. Should the United States plan to use military force in such a contingency to increase the odds for an advantageous resolution of North-South conflicts?

There is also a non-negligible chance that the present world order may break down because of "system overload" caused by exponential growth of population, incessant demand for energy and other natural resources, cumulative pollution of the planet's atmosphere and oceans, and the incapacity of obsolete forms of government to deal with the complexities of global interdependent industrial civilization.

If the working rules of the international system based on state sovereignty were to break down and countries were to engage in increasingly selfish national policies, lawlessness, chaos, and anarchy without precedent in modern times might emerge. As a superpower cast by

history in a role of world leadership, the United States would be expected to use its military force to prevent the total collapse of the world order or, at least, to protect specific interests of American citizens in the absence of an international rule of law.

Such contingencies might generate military requirements without precedent in the experience of American military planners, who may not yet fully comprehend the significance of events that are already happening, such as the intersection between the old East-West conflict, the new North-South conflict, and the accelerating consequences of planetary mismanagement.

More attention may have to be devoted to the development of doctrine, plans, weapons, and force structures in anticipation of possible uses of military force in some novel crisis situations. The American people may demand that its national interests be protected by all available means if global turbulence prevails in the 1980s.

The scientific and industrial revolutions that are driving the global process of modernization may produce in due course new patterns of human organization and thus reconcile what are now perceived as conflicting national interests, but this more distant future might be preceded by a period of chaos and anarchy over which the United States would have little control, but by which it will not want to be engulfed.

The military posture implications of such a situation are not self-evident. If a harsh international environment were to develop in the 1980s, additional military capabilities might be required besides the forces directly dedicated to Soviet and other well-understood contingencies. The configuration of these forces and the doctrine guiding their usage will have to be determined by military planners who understand the potential impact of the global transitional crisis that may result from developments of the kind discussed in this essay.

The North-South conflict should not be perceived as a temporary clash of interests produced by the fourfold increase in the price of oil since 1973, but as the expression of a much deeper conflict. It is the present stage of the political mobilization of the Third World, following several centuries of Western dominance. Its most visible expression is in the General Assembly of the United Nations, where more

than a hundred new countries that did not have sovereign status at the end of World War II are now in control, in accordance with the principle of majority rule.

This group of countries, which includes almost all of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, does not consider the process of decolonization completed by the achievement of political independence, believing that the economic dominance of the world market by the industrial democracies creates for them conditions of economic dependence and exploitation, to which they refer as "neo-colonialism."

An increasingly determined campaign is being waged by the Third World, through a variety of overlapping groupings, for the establishment of a "New International Economic Order." Although its articulated demands are economic, the general thrust of the movement is political, aiming at a major modification of the power relations between the former colonial powers who are at present the most advanced industrial societies and the former colonies who are still in the early stages of modernization and industrialization.

The Third World movement has many similarities with the growth of trade unionism in the West in the 19th century. Its dynamism is reflected in the fact that the number of participating countries has increased more than threefold in the last two decades. It is also a sign of its strength that recently some of the more moderate and pro-Western leaders of Third World countries are endorsing the positions of the radicals. As neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China is involved in this Third World movement, it would be misleading to interpret its manifestations as mere episodes in the Cold War.

The Third World's primary complaint is the poverty gap that separates it from the advanced countries. Third World spokesmen point out that an annual target of 5 percent net growth would only raise the per capita gross national income of the developing countries by \$85 by the end, in 1980, of the Second Development Decade of the United Nations, compared with an expected increase of \$1200 for the industrialized countries during the same time span. The relative condition of the Third World, which now includes about 70 percent of the world's population but subsists on only 30 percent of the world's income, will worsen as the result of this widening economic gap.

What the North-South conflict actually involves is a struggle for the world product, which is not likely to be resolved by a few brief summit meetings. The struggle will probably continue for a long time, with periods of negotiations interspersed with crises and confrontations. Nations, like individuals, do not divest themselves voluntarily of their accumulated wealth and of their sources of income merely in response to moral appeals. If they have the power to resist demands on their assets, the American people will probably expect their government to negotiate from a position of strength, and if they lack the power needed for the protection of their interests, they will hold their government accountable for having failed to maintain its preparedness.

This does not imply that the American people will necessarily engage in decades of conflict with the Third World over the division of the global product. Eventually, through the evolution of public opinion, a gradual process of accommodation may well occur, but the time for reconciliation is not yet ripe and a period of economic confrontation between North and South is likely to be an important dimension of the transitional crisis that the world may be facing in the 1980s.

It is conceivable that the most prosperous Third World countries will eventually drop out of the confrontation, as the volume and scope of their trade and other relations with developed countries having market economies expand. Judging from present trends, this will not happen very soon. The political solidarity of the Third World is getting stronger rather than weaker and may still be far from having run its course. The richest and most successful Third World countries may prefer, on political-emotional grounds, to be the leaders in a new global power configuration, rather than accept, on economic-rational grounds, the option of becoming junior partners of the industrial democracies. A lot will depend on whether the most prosperous Third World countries will continue to be governed by conservative leaders or will be taken over by radical-nationalist groups hostile to capitalist Western countries.

The anticipated protracted confrontation between North and South concerning the division of the global product might take place within the legal framework of the existing world order, which would tend to

reduce the amplitude of the turbulence engendered. Sovereign states accept a considerable amount of self-restraint, even in conflict situations, for the sake of maintaining a predictable environment, as this has considerable advantages for all parties engaged in international transactions.

But it is also possible that the prevailing world order might break down in the coming decade as the result of pressures that are not directly related to the North-South conflict. These pressures might actually increase as the process of modernization of the Third World unfolds because of the greater demands on resources generated by industrialized societies.

The scientific and industrial revolutions of the last two decades, through exponential growth, are threatening to overload the carrying capacity of the adaptive mechanisms that the human species has developed in the course of its most recent evolution. Imbalances in demographic dynamics, utilization of energy, and other natural resources; pollution and degradation of the environment; and persistence of obsolete patterns of social organization, public administration, and governmental decisionmaking are likely to worsen as a larger proportion of humanity undergoes the transition from an agricultural to an industrial stage of economic development.

Whether the evolutionary process will result a century or two hence in global misery or global abundance, in the near future this process does not seem to be amenable to global planning and management because the required institutional mechanisms do not exist and cannot be expected to be developed within a very short time frame. Since global mismanagement is likely to continue because of the inadequacy of the present world order, based on the concept of state sovereignty, there is a non-negligible chance that individual states will pursue increasingly selfish national policies, seeking to maximize their advantages to the detriment of the broader global community. The cumulative effect of such policies could result in the collapse of the present world order. The global transitional crisis that is likely to accompany the diffusion of modernization and industrialization to widening segments of mankind could initiate new patterns of international

organization, compatible with the demands of interdependence. But it could also produce a period of chaos and anarchy reminiscent of the Hobbesian notion of a "war of each against all."

The conclusion that humanity may be heading for chaos emerges from the critical examination of what on the surface might appear as promising initiatives in international organization, namely the United Nations conferences held since the early 1970s to deal with environmental protection, population growth, the food crisis, a new regime for the oceans, the status of women, the trade of basic commodities, human settlements, and water resources. For the first time in history, most sovereign states participated in detailed technical consultations and negotiations concerning the future management of humanity's finite resources on "Spaceship Earth." A large amount of statistical and other data were collected, analyzed, and made available to all interested governments and to international public opinion leaders.

Although the educational impact of the conferences discussing these global issues under United Nations auspices is not trivial, the immediate practical achievements of these first attempts to create mechanisms of global management range from modest to negligible and cannot be expected to change the course of events in the next decade.

A detailed survey of the conferences held during the last five years in Stockholm, Bucharest, Rome, Caracas, Geneva, New York, Nairobi, Mexico City, Vancouver, and Mar del Plata shows that the resulting decisions have contributed more to the expansion of the unwieldy United Nations bureaucracy than to improvements in the lives of the peoples living on this planet. Even the most imaginative humanitarian scholars concerned with the peaceful transformation of the prevailing world order do not expect that a new international system can be created before the end of this century. It seems therefore prudent to assume that, regardless of what the more distant future has in store for mankind, the impending transitional crisis could generate considerable international turbulence.

During that period, the United States may have to make difficult policy decisions. In some instances, it may have to give primacy to world order considerations, while in other situations it may have to

defend narrowly defined national interests. Recent public debates betray considerable uncertainty on how the United States should use military force for purposes other than the deterrence of the Soviet Union and the preservation of a global military balance. In deciding to use military force for the protection of limited national interests, a great power which is also a democracy has to be responsive to a wide range of considerations. Should the U.S. government be prepared to project its power into all parts of the world where Americans may wish to travel, trade, study, or engage in any other normal and peaceful activity, in order to protect them? If not, where should one draw the line?

The cost of modern conventional warfare is so great as to raise serious questions on the cost effectiveness of using military force for anything other than defense against direct attacks on the territory and population of the United States. According to the Department of Commerce, in 1974 the total value of private long-term and short-term American foreign assets in Third World countries was \$68.8 billion, less than half of the estimated cost of the limited war fought in Vietnam. Under present circumstances, is it still rational to plan military campaigns for the protection of American material assets abroad? Is it possible to conduct such campaigns in a cost-effective way?

The political costs of the use of military force can also be very high, especially to a great power. If the use it makes of its military power is not effective, its credibility suffers both with its friends and allies and with its potential enemies. But ruthlessly successful military operations can also be costly politically to a democratic government, which has to be responsive to public opinion and cannot ignore the moral dimensions of international relations.

The decision to use force for the protection of limited national interests is not likely to be made by a government accountable to the American people unless several conditions are met, including lack of remedy through the legal and political processes of the international community, a reasonable balance between the material and human costs of the intended military operations and the human and material benefits expected from their success, good odds that the resulting international public opinion will not be detrimental to the nation's moral and political standing and, of course, public understanding and support.

Were the contingencies examined in this essay to materialize, there may be instances during a period of global transitional crisis which could occur in the 1980s when force might be required in defense of American national interests. The practical value of U.S. military forces in such contingencies will depend on the development of doctrine, plans, weapons, and force structures offering good odds that the operations envisaged can be completed in a reasonable time span and at an acceptable cost in lives and material resources, within the constraints that may be politically and morally necessary.

Were force to be used by the United States against small and medium powers in the coming decade, such conflicts would occur in an international setting very different from the past when military power was so unevenly distributed that "gunboat diplomacy" could be used with impunity by great powers. Technology and economics are now combining to facilitate the diffusion of military power and to give the defense the benefit of cost effectiveness. By the 1980s, force as a political instrument in international relations may have become seriously constrained by the availability of cheap precision-guided weapons and even of nuclear weapons to countries that in the past could not have afforded effective defenses against great powers. The military situation might be rendered even more precarious for the industrial democracies by the availability of Soviet military assistance to Third World countries, if not on a long-term basis at least in crisis situations. Assistance may also be available before too long from the more prosperous and better armed Third World countries if weaker members of the movement become the object of Western coercion.

At the time of the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo, a number of statements by senior American officials and some academic books and articles raised the question whether "coercive diplomacy" should be used were such acts of economic warfare to recur. The public debate betrayed excessive confidence in the usefulness of force in future conflicts between advanced and developing countries.

On the basis of systematic research, which identified 215 incidents since the end of World War II in which U.S. forces were used as a political instrument, The Brookings Institution concluded recently

that the armed forces should not be used for political objectives abroad except under very special circumstances. The study established nevertheless that "demonstrative uses of the armed forces can sometimes be an effective way--at least in the short-term--of securing U.S. objectives and preventing foreign situations inimical to U.S. interests from worsening." Under contingencies more harmful to its way of life than the 215 incidents between 1946 and 1975, the United States may not have the choice of using force only under very special circumstances. In a harsh international environment, a credible capacity to use coercive diplomacy may become a major national security requirement.

Traditionally, naval vessels have been the preferred weapon system when force was needed as an instrument of bargaining rather than as an instrument of destruction. But in the 1980s, because of the advent of precision-guided weapons and in view of the possible interposition of Soviet naval power in conflicts with Third World countries, it may no longer be cost effective to place directly at risk high-value naval vessels for coercive diplomacy.

Yet perhaps the future usefulness of coercive diplomacy is less a function of the vulnerability of aircraft carriers and other naval vessels to new weapons than of whether air power, either sea-based or land-based, can be used effectively to compel an adversary to act in a desired way without damaging his economic assets more than is strictly necessary to obtain compliance and without excessive costs to the attacker. Such operations will require greater precision than conventional war fighting. It seems unlikely that they could be carried out in any other way than by the use of manned aircraft. Present USAF doctrine does not seem to provide adequate guidance on target selection and operational patterns for the use of air power in a coercive diplomacy mode.

Were the contingencies envisaged in this essay to materialize, the United States should not only be in a position to project its power abroad but should have a clear conception regarding the use of such power whenever necessary. Experience and prudence suggest that the presently available lead time, free from the constraints of crisis management, should be used to the fullest possible extent for conceptual development.

Projection of power abroad will always require a broad spectrum of capabilities. If coercive diplomacy becomes part of the regular cluster of missions, land-based long-range tactical aviation with the global mobility that a sophisticated air refueling capability will make increasingly possible may have many advantages over surface naval vessels: speed, flexibility, freedom from bases, and cost effectiveness. Precision-guided weapons and stand-off capability will permit careful selection of targets, to avoid unwanted collateral damage and costly combat operations for air superiority. Air power could then indeed carry out missions functionally equivalent to those of surface naval vessels in the days when maritime power reigned supreme.

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I. A CONTRIBUTION TO CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

This essay was written as a contribution to what the *Annual Defense Department Report FY1978* calls "contingency analysis." Certain military threats are well understood, such as the danger of nuclear war, Soviet propensities to expand their influence globally, and local conflicts in, for example, Korea, the Caribbean, or the Middle East. Military planners develop specific contingencies from these broadly defined threats and use them to design and test the U.S. defense posture. But, as the most recent *Defense Report* explains, it is not assumed "that these are the only contingencies to which U.S. forces can or will be committed."¹

The contingencies to which most attention is given in considering the design of U.S. general purpose forces are derived from areas of international tension that have produced crises in the past. But in the coming decade, new sources of turbulence may generate additional, perhaps even more urgent, requirements from U.S. military forces. If, for instance, there is a non-negligible chance that the world is entering a period of increased social instability and faces the possibility of a breakdown of the global order, as the result of a sharpening confrontation between the Third World and the industrial democracies, should the United States plan to use military force so as to increase the odds for an advantageous resolution of North-South conflicts? What roles and missions should the armed services of the United States prepare for in the context of the North-South conflict, taking into account the implications of transfers of sophisticated weapons to Third World countries and the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the next 15 years?

If the conclusion is reached that for political or technical reasons it will not be possible to use military force effectively to

¹*Annual Defense Department Report FY1978*, January 17, 1977, p. 52.

influence the outcome of disputes resulting from the North-South conflict, what implications should be drawn about the future force posture of the United States and about the management of U.S. relations with the Third World?

In addition to an exacerbation of the North-South conflict, there is also a non-negligible chance that the present world order might break down because of "system overload" caused by exponential population growth, incessant demand for energy and other natural resources, cumulative pollution of the planet's life-sustaining atmosphere and oceans, and the incapacity of obsolete forms of government to deal with the complexities of interdependent industrial civilization, in response to which sovereign states will be tempted to pursue increasingly selfish policies.

If the working rules of the state system which, with all its shortcomings, has served mankind well since the concept of state sovereignty was established in 1648 in the Peace of Westphalia, were to be abandoned, lawlessness, chaos, and anarchy without precedent in modern times could sweep the globe. The United States, as a superpower cast by history in a role of world leadership, would be expected to use its military force to prevent the total collapse of the world order or, at least, to protect the immediate interests of American citizens in an international environment increasingly devoid of the rule of law.

These new military requirements, without real precedent in past experience, could be rendered considerably more difficult if the Soviet Union were to take advantage of the North-South conflict and the breakdown of a world order previously dominated by countries with market economies, in the hope of decisively expanding its global influence. The international environment of the 1980s would be rendered even more turbulent if revolutionary powers such as the People's Republic of China or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam were to encourage global chaos in pursuit of their own millenarian visions.

It has been intellectually fashionable in recent years to produce forecasts of the human condition in the next century or two. Some of these exercises, such as those sponsored by the Club of Rome, reach

gloomy conclusions about the future of mankind.¹ Others, such as the Hudson Institute's, promise a happy and abundant life for all people in about two hundred years.²

Though stimulating, such projections have no operational relevance. No political decisions will be determined by the desire to achieve certain outcomes a century hence. With few and rare exceptions, political leaders live in the present and limit their concerns to the immediate future. Despite an occasional rhetorical flourish, the interests of "generations yet unborn" are not taken into account when policy decisions are made. Even those who are future-oriented are at best interested in the life span of their generation. Futurologists strain our credulity when they venture more than a few decades ahead. The next millenia are the unchallenged preserve of science-fiction writers.

The time horizon of this essay is limited to the next decade, the 1980s, because it extrapolates only from events that are already happening, even though their total significance may not yet be fully comprehended by military planners. It seeks to stimulate thought on the future requirements that might be generated by international crises caused by the combined impact of three major sources of international tensions, namely the old East-West conflict, the new North-South conflict, and the accelerating consequences of lack of planetary management.

I believe that not enough attention is being given to the development of military doctrine, plans, weapons, and force structures for use in novel crisis situations that may occur in the years ahead. The experience of recent wars may have little relevance and new principles may have to be developed.

Over the last thirty years, the United States has not lost military power in absolute terms, nor has it suffered a reduction of the industrial and demographic potential fueling that power. The American

¹Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows et al., *The Limits of Growth: A Report for The Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*, New York: Universe Books, 1972, *passim*.

²Herman Kahn et al., *The Next 200 Years--A Scenario for America and the World*, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976, *passim*.

GNP has increased consistently and the weapon systems now available vastly exceed in destructiveness and precision those of earlier years. What has changed is the doctrine guiding the use of American military power, as well as the international environment. At the end of World War II, the United States had unchallenged military supremacy, including a monopoly in nuclear weapons. Since then the diffusion of military power has completely changed the relative position of the United States in the world, although in absolute terms it may have greater capabilities than ever before. In World War II, the objective was "unconditional surrender" of the enemy, and all the resources available, including nuclear weapons, were used to achieve it. In Korea, only conventional weapons were used and combat was limited to the Korean Peninsula. In Vietnam, a strategy of conflict was adopted that made victory impossible. Future contingencies of the kind discussed in this essay may require strategies not yet developed.

The gap between rich and poor countries is so wide that no solution satisfactory to both sides is likely to emerge before the end of the 1980s. Therefore, the antagonism between North and South could become stronger during the period ahead. The Third World is bound to become subject to growing social tensions, due to the domestic pressure of population on resources in each country, the failure to reduce visibly endemic poverty and massive unemployment, the incapacity of governments to provide their population minimal amenities such as clean water, urban shelter, medical care, elementary education and, especially, hope for a better future.

In that setting, incidents in the North-South conflict, especially if they are amplified by Soviet interference and take place in an atmosphere of high tensions created by planetary problems for which no efficient management systems have been developed, could get out of hand in ways comparable to the peasant rebellions that in past centuries engulfed large parts of Europe or Asia, spreading like uncontrolled prairie fires before burning out, usually without achieving any purposeful goals.

In the 1980s, international conflicts may occur in a field of forces vastly different from the world we know. National governments

and international institutions are unable to control the exponential growth of populations that will spill across national boundaries, the voracious consumption of natural resources causing international competition that will increase as industrialization spreads, and the effect of the human species on the earth's ecology. The result is that the most important processes affecting the future of mankind are either not managed at all or are mismanaged.

Some obvious manifestations of this situation are the failure to control rapidly enough the growth and pattern of settlement of people, especially in the Third World, which is turning its metropolitan centers and in some instances even its countrysides into tinder boxes of social tension; the inability to produce and distribute food of desirable quality in all parts of the world; the wasteful use of non-renewable natural resources; the environmental depredation threatening the life-sustaining systems of our planet; and, worst of all, the inability to control the destructive urges that set the human species apart from other living creatures and the failure to direct human energy into constructive channels.

It is unrealistic to expect that these major forces, which will shape the 1980s and the decades beyond, can be controlled by American policy decisions. Unless directly and profoundly affected by a long-lasting international crisis of unprecedented scope, the American people are unlikely to assume major global responsibilities and allocate to such tasks a substantial proportion of their GNP.

THE DEFENSE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

The American people will want to continue to live well even if other parts of the world remain impoverished, tension-ridden, and chaotic because they cannot manage their resources effectively or close the gap fast enough. I doubt that the United States can do much to help solve these problems during the crucial transitional crisis of the next decade. The Third World will have to find its own way to industrial development. In the short run, while this process unfolds, the essential task for the United States will be to protect American interests in a turbulent era.

But it is not clear whether the United States can use force efficiently for the protection of specific American interests overseas, should the international environment of the 1980s become so harsh as to preclude the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and thus justify violence. Conflicts that are primarily socioeconomic in origin would more directly affect specific American individual and group interests than the ideological-political confrontations of the past three decades and may therefore elicit genuine popular support for firm responses.

The American people may demand that U.S. interests be defended by all available means. In this respect, the future might be quite different from the past. The Cold War was a matter of elite perceptions, which had to be conveyed to the general public by persistent propaganda to obtain popular support for costly foreign and defense policies that did not provide tangible benefits to individual Americans. Constraints on everyday life in the United States, resulting from economic disruptions produced by denial of access to natural resources or to markets, will be felt immediately by most Americans. These deprivations may generate intense pressure on the government to defend American interests.

If the global mismanagement of the past three decades continues and the web of international relations becomes hopelessly tangled, demand for new forms of coercion may become insistent, either for the protection of that modicum of international order without which advanced industrial societies cannot function or even as part of a desperate struggle for survival. The next decade could be particularly fraught with tension while mankind experiments with solutions to the imperfectly understood problems of modernization. In anticipation of these new possible contingencies, the United States should give special consideration to its ability to defend its position in world affairs. It should be able to defend its national interests and great power status from a position of economic and military strength, even if it is unwilling to accept further global responsibilities. This is not a cynical point of view but a damage-limiting strategy. The United States cannot telescope history and speed up the resolution of conflicts and the adaptation to new situations that only trial and error

over a period of time can achieve; the interests of the American people thus may be better served by devoting adequate resources to military preparedness than by continuing past attempts to change the world without an adequate understanding of the processes involved.

After three decades of relatively unsuccessful global social experiments, funded to a substantial degree by the United States, it may be time to assess the lessons of the recent past. I am aware of the moral implications of these conclusions. During the period of global adjustment mankind is entering, there may be no easy answers to questions on how to reconcile humanitarian anguish with cold-blooded cost-benefit analysis of the protection of the immediate interests of the American people. Not all historical experiments succeed, and the scientific and industrial revolution may prove unworkable on a global scale. It is too early to tell. Social experiments and convulsions resulting from the initial stages of the scientific and industrial revolution may produce, within a few decades, new patterns of human organization, providing solutions for what are now perceived as irreconcilable national interests, or they may lead to chaos and breakdown of the global order. Until these complex processes are sorted out by trial and error, the United States will face many difficult decisions. There will be instances when it should give primacy to world order considerations and other situations when it should defend narrowly defined national interests.

American goodwill alone cannot change either the drive to power of the Soviet leadership or the bitterness, volatility, lack of experience, and personal greed of the present generation of Third World elites, or the currently unmanageable workings of global interdependence. If the international system becomes increasingly overloaded, the United States has no more knowledge and foresight to change the course of human history than other nations, even if it had the desire to do so. Public policy should be based on minimizing the risks faced by the nation that a government has the mission to protect.

If prospects for a clement international environment are not good, it is necessary to prepare for harsh relations among states. The military posture implications of this conclusion are not self-evident. The

problem is a special version of the perennial question facing defense analysts: "What capabilities are needed and how much is enough?" which makes decisions on the level and configuration of all military forces difficult and controversial. I believe that in the coming decade the United States will need additional capabilities, usable for new missions, without destabilizing the crucial military balance with the Soviet Union.

The diffuse and unpredictable character of future Third World challenges or global threats makes it difficult to determine specifically what military forces besides those directly dedicated to Soviet contingencies will be required in the 1980s. What American military capabilities would reduce or eliminate the propensity of the Third World to exacerbate its confrontation with the developed industrial democracies? Can American national interests be protected militarily if global institutional breakdown creates chaos? What doctrinal innovations should guide the use of force in such situations?

There are no easy answers to these questions. Should the United States maintain rapidly deployable projection forces capable of giving muscle to acts of coercive diplomacy, of deterring attacks on overseas assets of interest to the United States, and of augmenting the military capabilities of friendly forces engaged in combat? Or should it adopt a "Fortress America" posture and dedicate its nuclear and conventional forces only to the deterrence or defeat of direct military attacks on American territories, while relying on the noncoercive market mechanisms for the solution of economic problems?

If the North-South conflict becomes a major source of turbulence and intersects the East-West conflict, the United States may find its way of life much more directly threatened than by the challenges of the Cold War years.¹ The nuclear "balance of terror" had a sobering

¹ An up-to-date survey of Soviet activities in the Third World prepared by Joseph Whelan and William B. Inglee of the Congressional Research Service at the request of Congressman Larry Winn, Jr., a member of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, was released on May 8, 1977, under the title, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, 186 pp.

effect on the governments of the two superpowers, even when feelings of hostility were running high. World War III was avoided by the rational self-restraint of Soviet and American leaders. Crisis management is likely to be much more complicated in a world in which the role of the superpowers has decreased, and a large number of countries, ruled by volatile elites, play an active role in international affairs. In such a setting, the consequences and reverberations of small conflicts will be difficult to assess and anticipate.

The international environment of the 1980s is likely to be erratic and unpredictable not only because of the growing number of active participants in power politics and of the explosive mixture likely to result from the intersection of the East-West with the North-South conflict, but because of the inherently turbulent character of world affairs in the period before the emergence of the next global order, during the transitional crisis.

The deterioration of the ecological balance of the planet does not have the same immediate and dramatic effect as traditional conflicts between states, because of its gradualness. But the remedy will be much more difficult to find. The requirement will be positive action on a global scale, for which the social, cultural, and political prerequisites are still lacking.

II. THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT

The political mobilization of the Third World is reflected in the changing character of the United Nations from an oligarchic instrument of the great powers into a demagogic arena for a majority of small states incapable of assuming even regional responsibilities. When the United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco on April 26, 1945, by 51 states, those of the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe constituted a majority. At the end of the 30th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1975, 107 developing countries, known as the Group of 77, had an absolute majority and exerted considerable moral, legal, and political pressure on the 25 countries that could be counted as industrial democracies. Of the dozen countries still outside the United Nations, only Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Namibia had still to go through the formal process of decolonization. The other 10 were independent states: North Korea, South Korea, Switzerland, Vietnam, Monaco, Nauru, West Samoa, San Marino, Tonga, and Angola.¹

The dominant issue at present in the United Nations is not so much preservation of peace among states but the liquidation of all remnants of colonialism and the creation of a new international economic order. Although this was not the intention of its founders 30 years ago, the United Nations has become the principal instrument for seeking structural changes of the global order, primarily in the social and economic sectors.

In the 1950s, when the decolonization of Africa was just beginning, Rupert Emerson wrote:

The unscrambling of the imperial eggs is as delicate and hazardous a task as anyone might ask for. Yet another source of trouble is the continued existence of gross differences in degree of development between the advanced and the underdeveloped peoples. It was, after all, these

¹Jean Schwoebel, "Les pays membres de l'organisation des nations unies," *Le Monde*, February 2, 1976.

differences which gave rise to colonialism. On a mass scale the bulk of "black Africa" lingers far behind the advanced West; other even less developed areas such as New Guinea still live in a quite different era. Asia and Africa are technically more backward now in relation to Europe and North America than they were a century ago, though China, India, and other countries have been driving forward.¹

As seen by the West, the process of decolonization is completed once the dependent territory has achieved the status of a sovereign state, the official consecration of which is admission to the United Nations. For the former victims of oppression, the achievement of legal recognition as an independent member of the international community is only a first step, facilitating the eradication of numerous other consequences of past subjection. Prominent among these effects are deep-seated feelings of self-doubt and continued economic dependence.

Both conditions generate intense resentments that Western minds may find hard to understand. Readers of Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* may recall that he wrote in 1961: "The natives' challenge to the colonial world is not a rational confrontation of points of view. It is not a treatise on the universal, but the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute."² With astonishing foresight, Fanon explained the Third World mentality that led 15 years later to the triumphal reception of the pistol-packing leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat, by the United Nations General Assembly:

Diplomacy, as inaugurated by the newly-independent peoples, is no longer an affair of nuances, of implications, and of hypnotic passes.... And when Mr. Khrushchev brandishes his shoe at the United Nations, or thumps the table with it, there's not a single ex-native, nor any representative of

¹ Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 406.

² Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, translated from the French by Constance Farrington, New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1966, p. 33.

an under-developed country, who laughs. For what Mr. Khrushchev shows the colonized countries which are looking on is that he, the moujik, who moreover is the possessor of space-rockets, treats these miserable capitalists in the way that they deserve. In the same way, Castro sitting in military uniform in the United Nations Organization does not scandalize the underdeveloped countries. What Castro demonstrates is the consciousness he has of the continuing existence of the rule of violence. The astonishing thing is that he did not come into the U.N.O. with a machine-gun; but if he had would anyone have minded?¹

AGAINST NEO-COLONIALISM

Seen from the perspective of the Third World, the North-South economic conflict is a continuation of the process of decolonization. Even before most African countries had obtained political independence, African nationalist leaders had concluded that economic and cultural dependence on the West constituted "neo-colonialism." The events of the past 20 years have strengthened these beliefs.

The government of Ghana, the first country of black Africa to achieve independence after World War II, was the initial champion of the campaign against neo-colonialism, under the leadership of the late President Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah gave wide publicity to the concept in the 1950s and developed his thesis at length in *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*:

Neo-colonialism is based upon the principle of breaking up former large united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable states which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial power for defense and even internal security. Their economic and financial systems are linked, as in colonial days, with those of the former colonial ruler.

At first sight the scheme would appear to have many advantages for the developed countries of the world. All the profits of neo-colonialism can be secured if, in any given area, a reasonable proportion of the States have a neo-colonialist system. It is not necessary that they all should have one. Unless small States can combine they must be compelled to sell their primary products at prices fixed

¹*The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 61.

by them. So long as neo-colonialism can prevent political and economic conditions for optimum development, the developing countries, whether they are under neo-colonialist control or not, will be unable to create a large enough market to support industrialisation. In the same way they will lack the financial strength to force the developed countries to accept their primary products at a fair price.¹

Reiterated in numerous meetings among representatives of the Third World, this vague resentment against what was perceived as continuing economic domination and manipulation by the developed industrial countries has become over the years a specific list of grievances.

It can be argued that the rhetoric of Third World meetings is not a true reflection of relations between developed and developing countries and that a quantitative analysis of actual transactions between countries in fields such as trade, finance, tourism, education, and communications is the only way to know with some accuracy what is happening. But political situations are determined partially by subjective perceptions. What the political leaders of the Third World tell each other about their relations with the advanced industrial democracies is what they believe and what shapes their attitudes and prompts their actions. This is why the statements used in developing the argument of this essay are more relevant than statistical data that may not have been absorbed by the Southern protagonists in their dialogue with the North.

The Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries issued at the end of a meeting of 25 Third World leaders in Belgrade in September 1961 was an accurate keynote to what has happened since. Besides demanding "immediate termination of all colonial occupation" and "general and complete disarmament," it also voiced views that have gained broad support in the intervening years. The text adopted in Belgrade stated in Paragraph 21:

The participants in the Conference consider that efforts should be made to remove economic imbalance from colonialism and imperialism. They consider it necessary to close,

¹Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, New York: International Publishers, 1965, pp. xii-xiv.

through accelerated economic, industrial, and agricultural development, the ever-widening gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced countries and the many economically less-developed countries. The participants in the Conference recommend the immediate establishment and operation of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. They further agree to demand just terms of trade for the economically less-developed countries and, in particular, constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and the restrictive measures and practices which adversely affect the trade and revenues of the newly-developing countries. In general, they demand that the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution be applied in all fields of economic development to hasten the achievement of international social justice.¹

The next paragraph spelled out an initial plan of action that resulted in the increasing coordination of all the developing countries' struggle for what was to be called eventually the "New International Economic Order." It was also one of the sources of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which met for the first time in Geneva in 1964 and inspired a wide variety of other consultations and arrangements, all seeking structural changes in the international economic system created by capitalism and imperialism in the two centuries since the Industrial Revolution. Paragraph 22 stated:

The participating countries invite all the countries in the course of development to co-operate effectively in the economic and commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the economic sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created by the economic blocs of the industrial countries. They invite all the countries concerned to consider to convene, as soon as possible, an international conference to discuss their common problems and to reach an agreement on the ways and means of repelling all damage which may hinder their development; and to discuss and agree upon the most effective measures to ensure the realization of their economic and social development.²

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The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961, Beograd: Publicisticko-Izdavacki Zavod Jugoslavija, 1961, pp. 259-260.

²*Conference of Heads of State (Belgrade), pp. 259-260.*

THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

The various stages and episodes through which the countries of the Third World joined forces and created a movement were by and large ignored by the general public in the developed countries and may have been misjudged by Western diplomatic observers.

To document the assertion that the North-South conflict is becoming a major factor in international relations and may dominate the international scene in the 1980s, the transactions of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in September 1973 in Algiers, are particularly informative. They illustrate the progression of the Third World movement in the period before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, which became a turning point in the relations between the Third World and the industrial democracies. By demonstrating that it could enforce an oil embargo and a fourfold increase of the price of crude oil against the world's most powerful coalition, the NATO countries, OPEC changed the posture of the Third World from defense to attack. Later historians may consider the appearance of the "oil weapon" a landmark comparable in importance to the Japanese victory against Tsarist Russia in 1904-1905, which triggered the awakening of nationalism in many parts of Asia by demonstrating that a colored nation could defeat a white one.

The Fourth Conference took place in Algiers in 1973. In 1961, at the First Conference, 25 countries had participated and three countries had sent observers; 75 countries sent delegations to Algiers, nine countries sent observers, three countries came as guests, and 12 liberation movements, the United Nations, the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity, the Arab League, and various labor unions were represented,¹ an impressive display of the growing strength and solidarity of the Third World.

The Declaration issued at the First Conference in Belgrade in 1961 stated explicitly that "the non-aligned countries represented at this Conference do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc."² In reality, the countries of the Third World had indeed become a bloc,

¹Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Volume 24, No. 563, September 20, 1973, p. 3.

²Conference of Heads of State (Belgrade), p. 256.

acting as the Group of 77 in UNCTAD conferences, dominating the General Assembly of the United Nations, and bargaining collectively in all encounters with the industrial democracies for major structural changes of the global order created during the age of Western dominance. They are, in essence, allies in a global protracted war against neo-colonialism.

President Houari Boumedienne, host and chairman of the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers, made this point clear in his opening address:

If the removal of colonial domination through the acquisition of national independence of peoples has become a historical reality, it is obvious that this independence will remain ostensible and formal unless complemented and supported by real economic emancipation. True, classical colonialism is on the retreat on many fronts, but it is expanding its reign across the world in another form, by taking control over the riches of the developing countries. Indeed, the countries of the Third World are subject to the pressure of foreign powers and multinational companies which are putting them in a position of economic dependence and subordination, thwarting all their development undertakings.

The plundering of national resources on the part of colonialism has not only been the decisive factor of an increasing lagging behind of the African, Asian and Latin American countries in all fields, but has also been a permanent cause of the deterioration of the economic and social position of those countries, which see how the gulf separating them from the industrialized nations grows wider every year. Do we need to be reminded that these plunders, past and present, those that attended the colonial conquests and those that are being carried out today in a more skillful but no less unscrupulous manner, have greatly contributed to the well-being of the West and its becoming ever richer? This holds true all the more so today when we can see the steady strengthening of this neocolonialist system of exploitation, when we can see how its rhythm is becoming faster and faster and its appetites ever greater, the aim being completely to exhaust the developing countries.

This situation is being further aggravated by the present structures and rules of international trade, which have chiefly been created to suit the interests of the industrialized powers and which are pushing the trade of the Third World countries to a side-track. It is as if the peoples of those countries were mere instruments in the service of the industrialized world which is becoming ever

richer and more developed while the Third World is becoming poorer and poorer and lagging farther and farther behind.¹

The Third World is probably wrong in its interpretation of the causes of its economic backwardness. However, the success of political movements is not determined by the scientific truth of their convictions but by the intensity with which they are held and by the means they can mobilize. President Boumedienne's keynote address is a classic statement of the thesis that the Third World is plundered by neo-colonialism, a system allegedly developed by the industrialized world to get richer while making the developing countries poorer. Most leaders of the Third World seem to believe this thesis or at least endorse it for political reasons, and many Western political and intellectual leaders accept its validity. Consequently, it becomes pragmatically true and is a driving force in the sharpening confrontation between North and South.

Exponents of the point of view of the industrial democracies retort that there is no efficient alternative to market forces in determining terms of trade, that multinational corporations are major vehicles for the transfer of technology and for the investment of risk capital needed to mobilize the natural resources of the developing countries, that the failure to achieve higher rates of economic growth in many parts of the Third World is due to the incompetence and corruption of their own elites, that the Industrial Revolution being only two centuries old has not yet had time to spread across the world, and that the neo-colonialist thesis is nothing but Marxist-Leninist propaganda swallowed whole by the gullible Third World.

The extensive and repetitious debates of the past three years suggest that the North-South conflict will not be resolved by theoretical arguments, however sophisticated, nor by minor concessions grudgingly granted piecemeal in response to the agitation of the Third World. What the developing countries seek is, as Boumedienne stated

¹"Creative Initiatives in All of International Life--The Opening Address to the Conference by President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), Volume 24, No. 563, September 20, 1973, p. 15.

in his address, to "radically alter the present historical circumstances" by a collective act of will, the achievement of which is now being relentlessly pursued.

An important indicator of whether a movement is getting stronger is to determine if the moderates are gradually becoming radicalized or the radicals are becoming isolated. In the North-South conflict, in a surprisingly short time, initially extreme positions have come to be accepted as commonplace among the leaders of the Third World. This is demonstrated by their willingness not only to attend meetings but to endorse the militant statements proposed by the most radical factions.

The Algiers Conference issued a Political Declaration of 96 paragraphs, a lengthy Economic Declaration, an Action Programme of Economic Cooperation, a Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation, and thirteen resolutions, including one condemning the development of the oil and petrochemical industry of Puerto Rico and "any projects or investments that could effect an irreparable change in the physiognomy, structure or ecology of Puerto Rico." Absurd as this particular resolution may seem, it was adopted by the heads of states and governments of what the Political Declaration described as "over half the countries of the world, representing the majority of the world population." Significantly, neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China participated in the Algiers Conference and therefore anti-American statements were not products of the Cold War.

Many of the most prominent moderate and conservative leaders of the Third World, some of them outspokenly anti-Communist, participated in the adoption of lengthy final statements, which did not include a single paragraph finding fault explicitly with anything being done in the world today by either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, except for mild admonitions to be more generous with economic aid in a section on "Cooperation with the Socialist Countries" in the Action Proposal of Economic Cooperation. The Western powers, by contrast, were denounced and condemned on innumerable counts.

Far from being politically neutral, the "movement of non-aligned countries" is aligned against the industrial democracies because of the trauma left by the colonial period. The tragedy of American foreign

policy since the end of World War II is that, although the United States had no colonial interests of its own to protect, it became the captive of the colonial interests of its Western European allies out of concern for NATO solidarity. The original purpose of that policy was to contain Soviet expansion, but 30 years later it appears that the Soviet Union is the direct beneficiary of the equivocal American policies on decolonization. Even anti-Communist governments consider the Soviet Union an ally in the anti-colonialist struggle.

This situation is considerably enhanced by the economic grievances of the Third World. The Economic Declaration of the Algiers Conference expressed alarm over the "failures" of the First Development Decade launched by a 1961 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, the "unsatisfactory implementation" of the recommendations of the Third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the "disappointing results" of the first three years of the Second Development Decade.

This negative assessment differed strikingly from the authoritative assessment of the same situation made by the prestigious Commission on International Development established in August 1968 by the World Bank, under the chairmanship of former Prime Minister of Canada Lester B. Pearson. Aided by a distinguished staff of experts, eight international economic statesmen concluded that in the Third World "the growth record has been good," based on the following facts:

The average total growth rate for seventy low-income countries since 1960 has been in line with the 5 percent annual target established for the Decade and some twenty countries have maintained a growth rate of over 6 percent per annum in the 1960's.¹

The difference in perspective is significant. The Pearson Commission concluded that "if the present rate of growth in developing countries is maintained, it will quadruple income per person in sixty to seventy years," though conceding that "for countries with present

¹ Lester B. Pearson, *Partners in Development--Report of the Commission on International Development*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969, p. 28.

per capita incomes of less than \$100 (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mali, Nigeria), it would mean great improvement but neither affluence nor the capacity to assure a wide range of choice to their citizens."¹

The Economic Declaration of the Algiers Conference included an "Assessment of the International Strategy of Development," which viewed the situation quite differently:

Even if the drive set for the second decade of development were to be achieved, which is doubtful, the per capita gross national income of the developing countries would only rise by U.S. \$85, as against U.S. \$1200 for the industrialized states.² In view of all this, the outlook for the period after 1980 can only be very pessimistic.

The Third World, which includes seventy percent of the world population, subsists on only thirty percent of the world income.

At the end of this decade, the average annual per capita income will be U.S. \$3,600 in the advanced countries, but only U.S. \$265 in the developing countries.³

UNIONIZATION OF THE THIRD WORLD

Between September 1973, when the Algiers Conference instructed its Chairman to request a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, and April 1974, when the Sixth Special Session was held in New York, the idea of a "New International Economic Order" emerged. It was not conceived as a magic wand capable of reconciling conflicting interests at no cost to anybody, but as a political operation with complex purposes. The Action Programme of Economic Cooperation adopted on September 9, 1973, in Algiers instructed President Boumedienne as Chairman to request a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly and to hold a ministerial meeting of the Group of 77 prior to that session. Contrary to an official U.S. interpretation, the Sixth

¹*Partners in Development*, p. 28.

²The figures came from *Trade and Development Policies in the 1970s*, Report by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD for the first review and appraisal of the implementation of the International Development Strategy, Document TD/B/429/Rev. 1, New York: United Nations, 1973, p. 3.

³*Review of International Affairs*, p. 24.

Special Session was not an improvisation "to divert attention from the oil price issue,"¹ but the outcome of a process that had started long before the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC.

The important message drowned in the noise of self-righteous Third World rhetoric that has flooded international debates since 1974 should not have been lost, even if it was not explicitly articulated. What the political leaders of non-Communist governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were telling the advanced industrial democracies was that they were foundering in their attempts to achieve economic growth and did not know how to retain control of their governments and protect the interests of the ruling pro-Western nationalist oligarchies without increased transfers of real resources from the industrial democracies.

The alternative, which most Third World governments wish to avoid, is mobilization of economic resources for a self-reliant pattern of development through Communist-style methods of coercion. Such a change in policy is not easy. It can only be carried out by destroying a wide variety of power centers representing special group interests, replacing the ruling elite legitimized by the nationalist struggle for independence by one supported by a party of mass mobilization, and radically altering the country's orientation toward the rest of the world. This is why the demand for a new international economic order articulated by the Third World majority at the Sixth Special Session in April 1974 should be seen as an attempt to initiate "collective bargaining" within the framework of an international capitalist system rather than as the opening shot of an international "class war" between rich and poor countries.

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq of the World Bank were among the first to perceive the parallel between the political mobilization of the Third World and the growth of the trade union movement. Schmidt wrote in 1974:

What we are witnessing today in the field of international economic relations--in the monetary field and now in the

¹"Preparations for the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Department of State Bulletin*, June 23, 1975, p. 867.

field of oil and raw material prices--is virtually the same as what is going on between trade unions and employers' associations on the national level. It is a struggle for the distribution and use of the national product, a struggle for the world product.¹

Dr. Mahbub ul Haq had expressed similar views for a number of years. In May 1975, he told a Conference on New Structures for Economic Interdependence:

First, the basic objective of the emerging trade union of the poor nations is to negotiate a new deal with the rich nations through the instrument of collective bargaining.... Second, the demand for a New International Economic Order should be regarded as a movement--as part of a historical process to be achieved over time rather than in any single negotiation.... Third, whatever deals are eventually negotiated must balance the interests of both the rich and the poor nations....²

Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs in the Indonesian cabinet, who participated in the drafting of the Manila Declaration by the Group of 77 in February 1976 and in the Fourth UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi in May 1976, told me in June 1976 in Jakarta that President Suharto and his cabinet--well-known for their moderate views and for economic policies favoring private foreign investments and reliance on free market forces--had concluded that political solidarity in the North-South dialogue was as important as short-term economic gains for their country.

It is very likely that the North-South confrontation will continue for an extended period, punctuated by negotiations interspersed with crises. Conflict will produce growing, though antagonistic, intimacy. The two sides will gradually become familiar with each other's point of

¹ Helmut Schmidt, "The Struggle for the World Product," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, p. 442.

² Guy F. Erb and Valeriana Kallab (eds.), *Beyond Dependency, The Developing World Speaks Out*, Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1975, p. 158. For a detailed presentation of his views, see Mahbub ul Haq, *The Poverty Curtain--Choices for the Third World*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, Part 3.

view. What once seemed inconceivable will appear later as commonplace. Indonesia's Minister of Mining, Professor Moh. Sadli, had told me as early as March 1973 that commodity-exporting Third World countries were contemplating cartelization to improve their terms of trade with the industrialized countries, but it never occurred to me that the price of crude oil would be drastically increased within six months. Now OPEC is commended for self-restraint because it increased the price of oil by only 10 percent for 1977.

Marking an important departure in the North-South dialogue, Secretary of State Vance told the final Ministerial Meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris on May 30, 1977: "There should be a new international economic system. In that system there must be equity; there must be growth; but, above all, there must be justice. We are prepared to help build that new system."¹ Nevertheless, concrete American proposals which would have been considered generous a few years ago were rejected as inadequate by the representatives of the Third World at the end of 18 months of negotiations.

PROSPECTS FOR PROTRACTED ECONOMIC CONFRONTATION

Accommodation of vastly divergent points of view is not accomplished by brief encounters at the summit. In the industrial democracies in particular, the public must understand and support governmental policies, especially when special interests are hurt and concessions or sacrifices are required. Major changes in public perception take time, especially if complex and unpopular issues are raised. This is why it is very unlikely that the North-South conflict will be resolved before crises and confrontations covered by Western media and extensive debates within the industrial democracies clarify and popularize the issues and prepare the public for major policy changes requiring concessions. The time is far from ripe for such developments, judging from the time it took for an issue like the Cold War to build up and then to be turned around.

Individuals and nations seldom divest themselves voluntarily of a large proportion of their accumulated wealth and sources of income in

¹ Address by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, May 30, 1977, Paris, Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1977, p. 645.

response to moral appeals invoking concepts of distributive justice. In the absence of a world government with the coercive power to tax the rich countries to transfer resources to poor countries, appeals for a "New International Economic Order" are not likely to be heeded, regardless of their moral justification.

Debates in the last few years have repeatedly elicited the question of whether the developing countries have the economic leverage to force the industrial democracies to accept their demands. In my opinion, the question cannot be answered in a purely economic framework. In foreseeable circumstances, the Third World can succeed in its attempt to restructure the global economic system only by an act of collective political will. The developing nations will have to close ranks, setting aside conflicting interests and values on other matters, to present a common front to the industrial democracies. Psychological and moral impulses and economic interests of Third World countries will have to be strong enough to override the multitude of disagreements. Without a new and unprecedented solidarity able to withstand the many special interests, the Third World will not be able to deal with the industrial democracies from a position of strength.

It is conceivable that before the end of the next decade, the common political will of the Third World will produce schemes by which the foreign exchange reserves of the oil-rich countries will be used to finance stockpiling operations of Third World producers of other commodities; the sophisticated weapons acquired by some of the regional powers will be dedicated to the deterrence of military pressure on some of their weaker neighbors; and geopolitical strategic assets such as control of straits, exclusive economic zones in the oceans, or air and naval base facilities will be jointly managed in ways that will increase Third World leverage on the industrial democracies. Under such assumptions, which are entirely possible, the rules of the game would be decisively changed to the detriment of the industrial democracies.

The often mentioned analogy with the growth of trade unionism in the Western world is entirely appropriate. Before it achieved the political strength that forced employers to accept collective bargaining, labor had to accept the wages dictated by the "free market." Friedrich

Engels described the situation of the workers in an editorial written in 1881:

As according to political economists, wages and working days are fixed by competition, fairness seems to require that both sides should have the same fair start on equal terms. But that is not the case. The Capitalist, if he cannot agree with the Laborer, can afford to wait, and live upon his capital. The workman cannot. He has but wages to live upon, and must therefore take work when, where, and at what terms he can get it. The workman has no fair start. He is fearfully handicapped by hunger.¹

Today most Third World countries, with the exception of the OPEC minority, are in a situation comparable to that of British workmen before the rise of the labor movement. Needing the revenue from exports both for current and developmental expenses, those countries have no choice but to accept world market prices, whereas the industrial countries are able to turn to alternative sources of supply or to develop substitutes for certain raw materials if prices rise. Like Engels' Capitalist, they "can afford to wait."

The OPEC countries are of course no longer comparable to early 19th century English workers subject to the "iron law of wages." Since the dramatic upheaval in the world oil market in 1973-1974, they have been able--until now at least--to dictate their monopolistic prices to the consumer countries.

The demands of commodity producers are not new; they have been studied and discussed since the end of World War II in academic circles as well as by international agencies such as the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The Department of State circulated in July 1976 a study that told the public:

¹ Friedrich Engels, "The British Labour Movement," in Emile Burns (ed.), *A Handbook of Marxism*, New York: Random House, 1935, p. 199.

North-South issues were very much to the fore in the 1946-48 negotiations; the LDCs argued then as now for exemption from obligations for themselves while insisting on full compliance by the developed countries; and the atmosphere in Havana was charged with confrontation.¹

The study quoted from the volume, *A Charter for World Trade*, published by Clair Wilcox in 1948, which cast considerable light on the early dynamics of the North-South confrontation:

The [Havana] Conference opened with a chorus of denunciation in which the representatives of thirty underdeveloped nations presented variations on a single theme: the Geneva draft was one-sided; it served the interests of the great industrial powers; it held out no hope for the development of backward states.²

The first session of UNCTAD held in Geneva in March-June 1964 gave the developing countries an opportunity to add a new dimension to the international discussions of commodity problems. Commodity agreements were seen as necessary to support economic development and their conceptual scope was broadened to encompass remunerative as well as stable price levels, the import purchasing power of exported commodities (terms of trade), and market access, especially through reduction of agricultural protection in developed countries.

On specific instructions from the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1964, UNCTAD sponsored commodity negotiating conferences on tin, sugar, cocoa, olive oil, and grains. It also initiated specialized consultations on oil seeds and oil, timber, rubber, lead, zinc, tungsten, and synthetics. The results of these consultations were disappointing, but the developing countries continued to press for agreements, especially through the Charter of Algiers advanced by the Group of 77, which met in November 1967 to prepare a common policy for the Second Session of UNCTAD scheduled for February-March 1968 in New Delhi. Some of the recommendations of the Group of 77 were accepted

¹Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *The Genesis and Demise of the ITO*, Report No. 516, July 14, 1976, p. ii.

²*Genesis and Demise of the ITO*, p. 10.

in New Delhi, but no progress was made either before or during the Third Session of UNCTAD held in Santiago in 1972. The frequency and intensity of consultations among Third World countries increased considerably during the 1964-1974 decade, with important political as well as economic consequences.

The discovery of the "oil weapon" undoubtedly acted as a catalyst, but the ingredients of the new movement had been assembled slowly over a long period of time. The analogy with the rise of trade unions comes again to mind. Adam Smith remarked two hundred years ago, in 1776, that "people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."¹ Nowadays, Third World countries seem to behave in similar fashion.

Sydney and Beatrice Webb, in their classic *The History of Trade Unionism*, sought an explanation for "the tardy growth of stable independent combinations among hired journeymen" in England. They found it "in the prospects of economic advancement which the skilled hand-craftsman still possessed."² According to the Webbs, trade unionism emerged when the skilled workers of England lost hope that they could establish an independent business, when more capital was required than they could accumulate in a few years. The early trade unions arose not from among the ill-paid and ill-treated general laborers but were the creation of skilled journeymen, as "the formation of independent associations to resist the will of employers requires the possession of a certain degree of personal independence and strength of character."³

The analogy can be carried one step further. The Webbs described how in the 18th century "industrial society (was) still divided vertically trade by trade, instead of horizontally between employers and wage-earners. This latter cleavage it is which has transformed the

¹Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Book I, Chapter X.

²Sydney and Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism*, London: Longmans Green and Co., 1920, p. 6.

³*The History of Trade Unionism*, pp. 26, 44.

Trade Unionism of petty groups of skilled workmen into the modern Trade Union Movement."¹

A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

We are witnessing a comparable evolution in the relations between developed and developing countries. Many of the countries of the Third World had strong ties with certain industrial democracies, based on special monetary, market, and supply relationships, as well as on political and security arrangements. The international economic community was organized on vertical lines.

Among the factors that now restructure international relations horizontally, creating two antagonistic camps that will be understandable not primarily on the basis of economic interests but in terms of political friend-foe relations, are the weakening of the major currencies of the industrial democracies, including the U.S. dollar; growing protectionism against the cheap labor of the Third World; increasing unwillingness of the major Western powers to carry regional and global security responsibilities; the acquisition by Third World countries of some of the technical and managerial skills needed by their economies; the shift of monetary strength to the major Arab oil producing countries; and a universal propensity toward military self-reliance. The trend points clearly in that direction. Contrary to hopes expressed by senior U.S. government officials in past years, the oil-consuming Third World countries have maintained a common political front with the oil-producing Third World countries, rather than join the oil-consuming industrial democracies in their efforts to reduce or at least stabilize the price of crude oil.

The militant phase of the North-South conflict began with the submission by members of the Group of 77, on April 30, 1974, of two proposals to the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, entitled "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" and "Programme of Action." Modified to some extent during intense last-hour negotiations between the Group of 77

¹*The History of Trade Unionism*, p. 46.

and the industrial democracies, in the Ad Hoc Committee chaired by Ambassador Fereydoun Hoveyda of Iran, the two draft resolutions were adopted without a vote by the Committee on May 1 and later in the day,¹ again without a vote, by the General Assembly.

It is often tempting to dismiss as empty verbal threats the proclamations of revolutionary groups issued before changed power relations endow them with historical legitimacy. No such documents are ever the result of consensus between representatives of antagonistic interests. The Declaration of Independence was not the product of a consensus between the people in the Thirteen Colonies and the British Crown. The Communist Manifesto was not drafted by a joint committee representing capital and labor. If the movement launched by the Third World becomes a major power factor in international politics, great importance will be attributed to the two documents adopted on May 1, 1974, regardless of the procedure by which they were adopted, of their inner logic, or of their accurate reflection of reality.

The next step in the North-South confrontation took place at the 29th (regular) Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted a "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" on December 12, 1974, by a roll-call vote of 120 to 6 (United States, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, and United Kingdom), with 10 abstentions (Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, and Spain). Initiated by President Luis Echeverria of Mexico after the Third Session of UNCTAD in April-May 1972, the Charter had been drafted by a Working Group of governmental representatives, which held four sessions. Senator Charles H. Percy, representing the United States in the final debate, deplored the "chasm which it has thus far proved impossible to bridge" and cited a few of the unacceptable provisions: "the treatment of foreign investment in terms which do not fully take into account respect for agreements and international obligations, and the endorsement of concepts of producer cartels and indexation of prices."²

¹ See United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Special Session, Document A/9556 (Part II), May 1, 1974, pp. 2-23, for text.

² "U.S. Votes Against Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," *Department of State Bulletin*, February 3, 1975, pp. 146-147.

The Fourth Session of UNCTAD, which opened on May 5, 1976 in Nairobi, became another indicator that the North-South conflict will not be speedily resolved and may become a major source of international tensions for years to come. In addressing the 2000 delegates from 150 countries, including 113 members of the Group of 77, United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim admitted that after 12 years of conferences and discussions not even "a modest package of measures" had been agreed upon.¹

The atmosphere in Nairobi was not conciliatory. Secretary of State Kissinger told two dozen cabinet ministers, on the eve of the opening of the UNCTAD conference, that "the Third World has to choose between slogans and solutions, between rhetoric and reality."² Two days later, in his formal address he warned the delegates:

The United States better than almost any nation could survive a period of economic warfare. We can resist confrontation and rhetorical attacks if other nations choose that path. And we can ignore unrealistic demands and peremptory demands.³

The delegates of the Third World were not impressed. They did not view their claims as merely rhetorical but as long overdue reforms of the international economic order. The Secretary General of UNCTAD, Gamani Corea, whose staff had prepared an integrated program for commodities, reminded the conference that

...there has hitherto been little international action to deal with the commodity problem, although it has figured on the agenda of international conferences over the last 30 years or more.⁴

¹ Michael T. Kaufman, "U.N. Trade Talks Opened in Nairobi by 150 Nations," *The New York Times*, May 6, 1976, p. 3.

² Associated Press, "Kissinger Warns Against Bloc Economic Power," *The Los Angeles Times*, May 5, 1976.

³ "UNCTAD IV: Expanding Cooperation for Global Economic Development," speech by the Secretary of State, May 6, 1976, Nairobi, Kenya, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 2.

⁴ Text of Statement by Gamani Corea, Secretary General of UNCTAD, at the Opening of the Fourth Session of the Conference, Nairobi, May 5, 1976 (mimeo).

President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, who had the mandate to present to the session the Manila Declaration adopted by the Group of 77 on February 7, 1976, sounded an ominous note asserting that the problems that had led to the creation of UNCTAD 12 years earlier "have grown in magnitude and scope":

From the grim awareness of the intolerable contradiction of want in the midst of plenty, and unprecedented knowledge in the midst of ignorance--which spurred us to organize the UNCTAD--we have now reached the equally grim prospects of unwanted protracted confrontation over these problems.¹

The most significant aspect of the Fourth Session of UNCTAD was the demonstration of the growing solidarity of the South. *The Los Angeles Times* reported:

For most of the 27 days of meetings here, the rich nations seemed fragmented and unable to agree, while the developing nations stuck with remarkable solidarity to demands their organization, the Group of 77, put together in Manila in February.²

The significance of UNCTAD IV was also grasped by some of the more sophisticated European commentators. *The Economist* concluded its assessment as follows:

Regardless of who is to blame, the third world has been hit harder in the current recession than anyone else, its terms of trade have been battered with only brief respites and none of its problems looks like going away for long. To talk, as Mexico's President Luis Echeverria did this week at the Habitat conference in Vancouver, of the poorer countries turning to violence if their cries are unheeded may seem melodramatic. So, no doubt, did similar warnings on the behalf of every pre-revolutionary proletariat in

¹"A New Measure for Man," speech delivered at the Fourth Session of UNCTAD, by Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Republic of the Philippines (mimeo).

²Dial Torgerson, "U.N. Economic Talks Close With Most Conference Problems Still Unsolved," *The Los Angeles Times*, June 1, 1976.

history. But long before world revolution comes about, the rich are going to have to confront the problems of the poor, the first of which may arise when third-world countries decide they can no longer meet the service payments on the \$130 billion they owe (much of it to private banks in the west). The split among the rich that developed at Unctad shows that many are understanding of the plight of the poor. They should put pressure on their fellows to keep open the lines of communication with the third world and to give something more than expressions of sympathy. If that grows out of Unctad, the conference can be considered a success.¹

The German weekly *Der Spiegel* remarked that if agreement could be reached on new pricing mechanisms for commodities after March 1977, this would be a major change, as currently not more than 30 men on the London Metal Exchange hold more power over the welfare of millions of people in many underdeveloped countries than their own economic leaders.²

UNCTAD IV was only one of many episodes in the North-South conflict. In August 1976, 86 non-aligned countries held their fifth summit meeting, in Sri Lanka, issuing lengthy declarations elaborating their economic claims and the common strategy they proposed to follow. In September, a Conference on Economic Cooperation Among Developing Nations was held in Mexico City to seek ways to effect the common strategy.

Luis Echeverria, who at that time was President of Mexico, reminded those present that the 24 richest Western countries have only 19 percent of the world's population but 65.5 percent of the world's gross national product, while 61.5 percent of the world's population has 14.9 percent of that wealth. The balance of payments deficit of the Third World countries had reached \$40 billion in 1975, whereas aid from the highly industrial countries amounted to only 0.3 percent of their GNP, instead of the promised 0.7 percent.

Gamani Corea, the Secretary General of UNCTAD, argued that only through "collective self-reliance"--the development of strong and intimate links between the countries of the Third World--could the 113 members of the Group of 77 enhance their strength in their negotiations

¹"Only Hope Out of UNCTAD," *The Economist*, June 5, 1976, p. 71.

²*Der Spiegel*, June 7, 1976, p. 130.

with the rest of the world. The purpose of the conference in Mexico City was to translate the abstract general principle of "collective self-reliance" into effective mechanisms.¹

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OR CLASS WAR?

It is difficult to conceive scenarios that would result in the Third World's abandoning its claims and accepting with stoic resignation the consequences of a process of economic growth that would require "several generations for the benefits of development to trickle down until they finally reach the poorest groups."² Some observers of the international scene believe that it is equally difficult to conceive scenarios that would allow the Third World to threaten the survival of the industrial democracies or jeopardize their vital interests. In my opinion, it is as unrealistic to extrapolate from the present benign stage of the North-South confrontation and assume that it will remain limited to verbal attacks at international gatherings as it was not long ago to dismiss the growing nationalist and anti-colonial movements as the deviant behavior of a few Western-educated Asians and Africans.

To return once more to the analogy with the growth of the trade union movement, the failure of "collective bargaining" could lead after a few more years of mounting resentment and deepening crisis to an international "class war." Skeptics who dismiss the possibility of serious confrontation stress that the Third World is militarily weak, politically divided, and economically dependent on the industrial democracies. But at the pace at which events are moving, within another decade several Third World countries will not only control substantial financial resources but will also possess sophisticated conventional weapons and perhaps even nuclear capabilities.

Although the process could be reversed by unexpected developments, a common political will is emerging in the Third World that may be

¹ Abstracts of the two speeches, as reported by Agence France Presse from Mexico City, FBIS Latin America, No. 180, September 15, 1976, pp. M4-6.

² International Labor Organization, *Employment, Growth and Basic Needs*, Geneva, 1976, p. 4.

gradually overriding the many divisive conflicts within that heterogeneous group of countries. At the August 1976 Colombo conference of the Non-Aligned Chiefs of State and Government, the appeal was repeatedly heard that particular antagonisms should not distract Third World countries from their common cause. Future meetings of Third World leaders are likely to strengthen further their group solidarity through constant peer pressure and ideological overbidding.

As for economic dependence on the industrial democracies, there is no question that the Third World now requires capital, technology, and management from the advanced countries. But efforts such as the September 1976 conference in Mexico City, which explored ways to give meaning to the concept of "collective self-reliance," are not insignificant, in view of the increasing amounts of capital available to the major oil exporting countries. A strong leader or group of leaders in the Third World could emerge in the next decade to orchestrate these various capabilities and turn them into powerful leverage on the industrial democracies.

Even if the financial and environmental cost of autarky could be carried by the American people without unacceptably painful changes in their way of life, the closest partners and allies of the United States--Western Europe and Japan--could not rely on their inherent economic resilience, being much more dependent on imported natural resources. If the United States abandoned the other OECD countries to their fate in an economic war initiated by the Third World, the global political and military balance could change drastically very rapidly. The Soviet Union could step in and establish new relations with Western Europe and Japan, leaving the United States isolated in a hostile world. It follows that a sharpening North-South conflict would require American capabilities to protect the whole interdependent system of advanced industrial democracies, not only against the military threats of the Soviet Union and its allies but also against undefined contingencies that might emerge in the coming decade.

These gloomy conclusions of an analysis of trends in the North-South conflict could be dismissed with the optimistic observation that the most powerful and wealthy Third World countries will find it increasingly in

their interest to consolidate their economic, political, and military ties with the United States and other advanced industrial democracies, rather than act as the leaders of the poor countries in an exacerbated North-South conflict. This argument has considerable merit if we can assume that the major Third World ruling elites will remain in power long enough to achieve substantial economic development in partnership with the industrial democracies. But the longevity of the present ruling elites is subject to grave doubts. A close study of the internal political dynamics of the most advanced developing countries leads to the conclusion that the current conservative elites may be displaced in the coming decade by radical-nationalist younger leaders hostile to the West.

Even under favorable circumstances, in Third World countries economic growth and its beneficial social effects are bound to be uneven in the short run. Increasing rural poverty and explosive tensions among the growing urban masses, a deepening sense of frustration or even despair among students and intellectuals, the constant provocation of the corrupt practices and ostentatious life styles of the ruling elites, and the elites' choice of priorities in directing national development could result in sustained and profound domestic political convulsions before the end of the 1980s.

As the population of Third World countries becomes more politically conscious, not only through the endeavors of political agitators and organizers, who are not in short supply, but through public education and access to media news, the likelihood increases that small groups of radical activists will emerge and that their message will appeal to the masses. If radical-nationalist governments take over in a number of important developing countries, the likelihood of a major Third World coalition against the industrial democracies will be greatly increased.

A coordinated campaign of intense pressure on the industrial democracies would then become a likely and plausible threat. An alliance of radical-nationalist Third World countries could attempt to achieve goals that now strike us as mere rhetoric, such as demands for financial compensation for the wealth allegedly extracted by the West during the Age of Imperialism. In a world in which violence has come to be used in unprecedented ways, the future vulnerability of the industrial democracies should not be underestimated.

III. PLANETARY MISMANAGEMENT

Environmentalism was not yet popular when, at the initiative of the Swedish government, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided unanimously on December 3, 1968, that a United Nations Conference on the Human Environment should be convened in 1972. General Assembly resolution 2398 (XXIII) of 1968 set out as the basic purpose of that conference to focus the interest of governments and public opinion on the importance and urgency of environmental problems and to stimulate and provide guidelines for action by national governments and international organizations in their attempts to achieve solutions for the problems of the human environment.¹

Between 1968 and 1972, the growth of concern for the environment was prodigious, stimulated in part by the dramatic success of the Apollo 11 mission when, on July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong exclaimed while first setting foot on the lunar surface, "That's one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind,"² and millions of people saw Planet Earth on TV as a small globe floating in space. The success of the June 1972 Stockholm Conference in arousing broad interest not only in environmental protection but in planetary problems in general made that event a landmark, different from the many gatherings of government officials and experts through which international organization had slowly progressed since the establishment of the Universal Postal Union in 1878.

It was the first major reaction of international public opinion to several decades of planetary mismanagement.³ Before World War II,

¹ Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Sweden's Reply to the United Nations Enquiry in Connection with the Preparations of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment*, Stockholm, 1970, pp. 5-6.

² *Aeronautics and Space Report of the President*, transmitted to the Congress in January 1970.

³ Tom McCall, who distinguished himself as a practical environmentalist while governor of Oregon, first used this phrase in a lecture in Honolulu on "Earth 2020" in which he said: "Our present system is one of planetary mismanagement. We are using up finite reserves in such

the spread of industrialization and the results of population growth had not reached threatening proportions. There was no international sense of urgency.

The United Nations was established in April 1945 to help mankind achieve peace and welfare through a Security Council and an Economic and Social Council, viewed as the two equally important executive organs of its member states, acting in accordance with policy guidelines provided by their representative body, the General Assembly. The United Nations largely failed in both purposes. The Security Council was paralyzed by power politics, expressed through the use of the veto by its five permanent members, and the Economic and Social Council was reduced to the useful but limited role of monitoring developments through statistical and analytic studies and to providing experts with a clearinghouse for their ideas. The international community lacked the political will to undertake significant action programs on a global or even regional scale. The world needed new management systems to cope with growing global interdependence and with the need for a better allocation of resources under conditions created by the population explosion, compounded by the spreading demands of industrial civilization and by the difficulty of coordinating any policy in an international system composed of three times as many sovereign states as at the end of World War II.

By the early 1970s, there was enough political will in the international community to interest governments in holding a number of special gatherings devoted to the study of problems common to all mankind, under United Nations auspices. The first in the series, the 1972 Stockholm Conference, defined the format and style of a number of related conferences. However useful for educating international public opinion on major global problems, these conferences indicate that in the setting of the present world order, based on sovereign states, comprehensive and effective global management systems are not likely to be established before the end of the next decade and that consequently it would be dangerous to expect that the global transitional crisis will be mitigated by new institutional mechanisms.

a way that we are burdening the ecological system, heightening political anxieties, and eroding social and economic systems of life," *The Honolulu Advertiser*, July 2, 1974.

Following the Stockholm Conference, the World Population Conference was held in Bucharest in August 1974 and in October the World Food Conference took place in Rome. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met four times, in Caracas, Geneva, and New York, between 1974 and 1977. A United Nations Conference on Women was held in 1975 in Mexico City. The fourth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development assembled in May 1976 in Nairobi, the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements in June 1974 in Vancouver, and the United Nations Conference on Water at Mar del Plata, Argentina, in March 1977.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

The Stockholm Conference is a meaningful test case, although it is premature to draw general conclusions from it. It generated unusual emotional intensity among official delegates and in the parallel Environmental Forum, which offered discussions open to the general public and received considerable media coverage. The feeling in Stockholm was that one was witnessing the dawn of a new planetary awareness. The formal Declaration adopted on June 16, 1972, proclaimed:

In the long and tortuous evolution of the human race on this planet a stage has been reached when, through the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man has acquired the power to transform his environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale.

After mentioning pollution, poverty, and population growth as the major problems facing mankind, the Declaration stated:

A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental consequences.... To defend and improve the human environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal for mankind--a goal to be pursued together with, and in harmony with, the established and fundamental goals of peace and world-wide economic and social development.¹

¹United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment*, document A/Conf. 48/14, July 3, 1972, pp. 2-3.

The Declaration listed 26 "Principles"--the first guidelines ever for global environmental policies. A lengthy and detailed "Action Plan" presented 109 recommendations on environmental assessment and environmental management, and a number of supporting measures. New principles of international law and conduct were being created.

On December 15, 1972, the General Assembly of the United Nations took note "with satisfaction" of the report on the Conference on the Human Environment. Another resolution adopted as a new principle of international law that "in the exploration, exploitation and development of their natural resources, States must not produce significant harmful effects in zones situated outside their national jurisdiction." The General Assembly also agreed on institutional and financial arrangements for a "United Nations Environment Program" (UNEP) and established a Governing Council for Environmental Programs composed of 58 members, an Environment Secretariat headed by an Executive Director, an Environmental Coordination Board, and a voluntary Environment Fund with a \$100 million target for the first five years. Nairobi was chosen by the General Assembly to be the location of the Environment Secretariat.¹

The Stockholm Conference stimulated attention to the environment in many countries that had been oblivious to such problems. Eighty-five governments provided national reports to the Conference, "comprising in most cases the first survey they had ever conducted of their own environmental concerns."² Many countries created new governmental institutions, similar to those established in the United States in 1970, and enacted new environmental legislation.

After being in existence for only four years, the UNEP perhaps cannot be expected to show great accomplishments. But after examining the reports prepared by the Executive Director for the fourth session of the Governing Council, which was held in March-April 1976 in Nairobi,³

¹Text of General Assembly Resolutions 2994, 2995, 2997, and 3004 (XXVII) of December 15, 1972, *Department of State Bulletin*, January 15, 1973, pp. 56-59.

²Maurice F. Strong, "One Year After Stockholm--An Ecological Approach to Management," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1973, p. 694.

³United Nations Environment Programme, *Review of the Status of the Programme; Review of Priority Subject Areas and of Related Activities; Proposed Fund Programme Activities 1976-1977*; UNEP Documents GC/60, 61, 62, January 1976.

I believe that UNEP will not soon achieve breakthroughs in setting up global environmental management systems. It has become another component of the United Nations bureaucracy. Like other segments of that organization, it generates activities that justify its existence, contributes modestly to the understanding of certain problems, and helps to educate the participating governments, but lacks effective support through the mobilized political will of the international community. There is a vast array of activities, but they are unlikely to have a critical effect on mankind's relations with the life-sustaining systems of the planet.

Maurice F. Strong, who has devoted much thought and energy to these problems, perceived this when he reviewed the results of his efforts one year after Stockholm, in an 1973 article in *Foreign Affairs*. After discussing the fears of those worrying about nuclear holocaust and ecological disaster, he wrote:

Another vision of potential disaster is less dramatically cataclysmic than either nuclear destruction or catastrophic physical breakdown, but not less dangerous for that. It is the prospect of a slow but probably accelerating slide into chaos due to social limits on our ability to cope with the complexity inherent in a high technology society. Political, psychological and institutional limitations could condemn the world to a vicious cycle of interlocking crises, with the institutional structure of society breaking down or becoming paralyzed by the sheer weight and complexity of problems it cannot handle.¹

Prophets of doom and gloom have never been popular from the time Isaiah scoured the Hebrew elites for grinding the faces of the poor to the present. But we must face reality: it is possible that the compound effect of a number of global problems, which may be getting increasingly worse as the result of exponential growth, will overload the carrying capacity of the present international system. As basis for a world order that must solve the complex global problems created by the scientific and technical revolutions, the system is obviously inadequate. Perhaps only some form of world government, or perhaps

¹"One Year After Stockholm," p. 697 (emphasis added).

institutional principles entirely different from those which have evolved until now, will prove adequate in the future.

Such governmental-social innovations are very unlikely during the remaining years of the 20th century. Before new patterns evolve, the transitional crisis can hardly fail to get worse in the absence of rapid and vigorous solutions to problems such as overpopulation and maldistribution of people; scarcity of food, medical care, and educational facilities; misallocation and depletion of natural resources, especially oil and gas; protection of human liberties against the growing power of the state; the dehumanizing impact of excessive urbanization and unemployment; large-scale industrial pollution of air and water; and control of nuclear explosives and radioactive wastes.

I chose environmental protection as an initial example of the inability of the present world order to act efficiently because concern for that set of problems started with unusual emotional intensity, raising hopes that it marked the starting point of a new age of global awareness. But environmental degradation is a relatively slow process. Its impact is greatest where industrial progress has created affluence. The countries affected are a small minority within the total community of states and their population is less than one-fifth of mankind. The majority, on both counts, consists of countries anxious to industrialize in order to overcome poverty and not yet concerned or affected by the pollution which has accompanied the spread of the Industrial Revolution.

POPULATION GROWTH

Population growth is just the opposite. The underdeveloped countries are seriously affected by excessive rates of growth. Longer lives made possible by science and technology in the developing countries have not yet resulted in a parallel drop in fertility rates. The annual rate of population increase in some developing countries is more than three times higher than in some developed countries. Because of demographic dynamics, population continues to grow, even if control measures are successful, for up to 70 years after fertility rates reach

replacement level. Prospects are truly grim for countries and governments lacking adequate resources to overcome the poverty plaguing even their present population.

Yet the World Population Conference held in Bucharest in August 1974 contributed nothing to the establishment of more efficient, rational, global management systems for population problems, and gave no indication that the Third World perceived the population problem with the sense of urgency that available statistics warrant. Careful projections by United Nations demographers lead to the conclusion that if the level of world fertility continues to decline only at anticipated rates it will take about one century before world population growth levels off, after reaching 15 billion. But if replacement-rate fertility of about two children per family could be achieved by the year 2000, world population could be stabilized at about 8 billion by the middle of the next century.¹ The difference in future pressure on national resources is so obvious that further comments on the importance of this demographic conclusion seem superfluous. But the majority of the participating governments were not impressed.

Marcus F. Franda, writing for the American Universities Field Staff, explains what the organizers of the Bucharest Conference had in mind:

The goal of both the conference organizers and the U.S. delegation was to secure general acceptance of a draft World Population Plan of Action (WPPA), a 20-page consensus-building document which had as its key clause paragraph 27, and especially the recommendation that "all countries...make available to all persons who so desire...not later than 1985, the necessary information and education about family planning and the means to practice family planning effectively and in accordance with their cultural values."... For the U.S. delegation, and for the conference secretariat...nothing in the WPPA was as essential as paragraph 27. In the words of one

¹Richard N. Gardner, *The United Nations and the Population Problem: Planning for the 1974 World Population Conference*, The Institute of Man and Science, Rensselaerville, New York, and The Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Colorado, p. 12.

of the conference organizers, "Most of the rest of the draft Plan of Action consisted of statements and recommendations supportive of that particular paragraph, or statements that were intended to please those nations that might otherwise not agree to that paragraph."¹

But the American delegation was not successful in its endeavor to achieve through the WPPA "a world goal of replacement level of fertility by the year 2000."²

In the working committees, most delegations from Latin America, Africa, the Communist countries, and the representative of the Holy See sided with the People's Republic of China in eliminating concerted action from the WPPA. The principle adopted was, in the words of the Chinese delegation, that "any international technical cooperation and assistance in population matters must follow the principles of complete voluntarism of the parties concerned, strict respect for state sovereignty, absence of any strings attached and promotion of the self-reliance of the recipient countries."³

For almost three years now, the World Population Plan of Action⁴ has been in the files of the 135 countries (with delegations totaling 1287), the 331 representatives of nongovernmental organizations, the 1204 other participants, and the 991 journalists who came to Bucharest in the summer of 1974. It is doubtful that it is having a significant effect on population dynamics and thus on the creation of a rational world order, beneficial to the welfare of all mankind. Although quite sensible in stating the demographic aspects of the human condition, the document is the product of bureaucratic-diplomatic wrangling, not a compelling agreement. It has probably attracted less attention in the Third World than the speech of Huang Shu-Tse, head of the Chinese delegation, who told the Bucharest Conference that the fact that the world's

¹Marcus F. Franda, "Reactions to America at Bucharest," *Field Staff Reports, Southeast Europe Series*, Vol. XXI, No. 3, September 1974, p. 2.

²Statement by HEW Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, Plenary Meeting, August 20, *Department of State Bulletin*, September 30, 1974, p. 432.

³"Reactions to America at Bucharest," p. 7.

⁴*Department of State Bulletin*, September 30, 1974, pp. 440-453.

population "has grown rather quickly" is "not at all a bad thing but a very good thing." The reason given by the Chinese Vice-Minister of Health is, I believe, directly relevant to my argument that mankind is heading toward chaos:

In the situation of "great disorder under Heaven," in which the broad masses of the people are increasingly awakening, the large population of the Third World constitutes an important condition in strengthening the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism and accelerating social and economic development.¹

Not to be outdone, the delegate from the Soviet Union made equally irresponsible statements. He told Committee II of the World Population Conference that with proper planning, the necessary technology, and the elimination of capitalistic monopolies, the earth could comfortably feed 35 billion people.²

In stark contrast with such demagogery, the head of the U.S. delegation, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Caspar W. Weinberger, stated in the Plenary Meeting of the Conference:

According to the U.N. medium projection, the world's population will reach about 6.4 billion by 2000 and over 11 billion by 2050. If, however, delegates agree at this conference and are able to persuade their countries to endeavor to attain the practicable goal of a replacement level of fertility--an average two children per family--by 2000, the world's population in that year will be approximately 5.9 billion. Countries with high fertility will still double or treble their populations, but the world total in 2050 will be about 8.2 billion rather than in excess of 11 billion. The difference is, of course, a half billion people in the year 2000 and over 3 billion in 2050. The quality of life our children enjoy or suffer in 2000, and our grandchildren in 2050, will be deeply

¹ Marcus F. Franda, "The World Population Conference: An International Extravaganza," *Field Staff Reports, Southeast Europe Series*, Vol. XXI, No. 2, p. 7.

² Quoted by Christian A. Herter, Jr., *Department of State Bulletin*, September 30, 1974, p. 436.

affected by the course we take at this conference and later in our countries.¹

The self-evident pragmatic humanism of this statement did not prevent a host of commentators, not only in the Third World or Communist countries but even in the United States, to impute a variety of ulterior motives, including racism and power politics, to the policy of the United States concerning global family planning.²

THE FOOD CRISIS

The World Population Conference transmitted five resolutions to the World Food Conference to be held in Rome in November 1974; none mentioned the need to curb population growth.³ The World Food Conference had first been proposed by President Boumedienne of Algeria in September 1973 at the fourth conference of Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries. Later the same month, addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations in one of his first acts as Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger suggested a World Food Conference under United Nations auspices. On October 10, 1973, the 126-nation Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) called for international action to build up stocks of grain to make sure the world would have enough food in times of bad crops or national disaster--a "minimum world food security scheme."⁴ A resolution establishing the World Food Conference was adopted by the General Assembly on December 17, 1973.

Grant Cottam of the American Universities Field Staff considered it "indicative of the magnitude of the food crisis" that the first

¹Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1974, p. 433.

²Elihu Bergman, "Organizing the U.S. Government Response to Global Population Growth: A Perspective on Interests, Capabilities and Structures," *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, Appendices, Vol. I, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 69.

³Grant Cottam, "The World Food Conference--Population Growth and The Earth's Food Problem," *Field Staff Reports, West European Series*, Vol. IX, No. 5, p. 1.

⁴Paul Hofmann, "Grain Stockpiling Asked by U.N. Body," *The New York Times*, October 11, 1973.

suggestion for a World Food Conference came at the end of the harvest of the best crop year the world had ever known.¹ By the time the conference met in Rome in November 1974, the food situation was much worse than the previous year. Floods, droughts, and cold weather in various parts of the world had created an urgent crisis.

The Conference was attended by delegations from 135 countries, 18 United Nations organizations, 28 intergovernmental organizations, and 161 nongovernmental organizations. Four hundred members of the press covered the proceedings. One hundred and four delegations addressed the plenary sessions. Few speeches added anything substantive to the debate: "The poor countries generally made a plea for help, the Communist countries blamed the food problem on imperialistic capitalism, and the developed countries enumerated the great contributions they were already making toward the solution of the food problem."²

Because of the unexpectedly poor harvests of 1974, much of the energy of the Rome Conference was devoted to the grain shortage in South Asia and the sub-Saharan region of Africa, estimated by the FAO at between 7 and 11 million tons. A. H. Boerma, the Director General of FAO, was able to bring even the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China together at a working luncheon to discuss cooperative action for dealing with the world food crisis.³ The U.S. government refused to be committed to increase emergency food aid by a million tons to nations threatened with famine, because--in the words of then Secretary of Agriculture, Earl L. Butz--the increase "would have a bullish effect on the market."⁴ The American delegation was divided on whether food was primarily, as Secretary Butz repeatedly said, "a tool in the kit of American diplomacy,"⁵ a resource for meeting humanitarian needs, or a commodity to be sold on the international market to the highest bidder.

¹"The World Food Conference," p. 3.

²"The World Food Conference," p. 4.

³Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Food-Rich Lands Weigh a Program to Fight Hunger," *The New York Times*, November 8, 1974.

⁴William Robbins, "U.S. Commitment to More Food Aid Rejected by Ford," *The New York Times*, November 16, 1974.

⁵Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Puts Politics First in Food Aid," *The New York Times*, November 16, 1974.

The political problems grain exports raise in the United States are a good illustration of the extraordinary difficulties that any attempt to set up global management systems would encounter. Elected American officials have to be responsive to the interests of their constituents, not to global considerations. They will rarely attempt more than incremental changes if the required policies would be contrary to special American interests, as perceived by the groups most directly affected, such as American grain producers.

In 1975-1976, the United States accounted for 47 percent of total world wheat exports and 56 percent of the world's coarse grain exports. The total American share of world exports for all grains increased in the previous four years. Harold O. Carter, after reviewing numerous food and population studies, concluded that although all studies expected increasing cereal grain deficits in the developing countries in the 1980s, "there is general agreement in the reports that cereal production in 1985 will balance effective demand for cereals in various uses on a world-wide basis."¹ This means that the United States would have in the near future enormous leverage on the rest of the world as the major global source of food. Until agricultural productivity increases in the developing countries, American farmers would be able to reap handsome profits from grain exports. They would naturally expect the U.S. government to protect and support their business opportunities.

Before the World Food Conference in 1974, the Office of Political Research of the Central Intelligence Agency examined the implications of the food situation in terms of power politics and concluded that "the world's increasing dependence on American surpluses portends an increase in U.S. power and influence, especially vis-à-vis the food-deficit poor countries." The study speculated that, if climatologists who believe a global cooling trend is underway are right, "U.S. production would probably not be hurt much [and] the U.S. might regain the

¹Harold O. Carter, "World and U.S. Food Trends: A Current Perspective for Policy," *AEI Studies on Contemporary Economic Problems*, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976, p. 303.

primacy in world affairs it held in the immediate post-World War II era."¹

Climatologists are divided between those who believe that "the greenhouse effect" produced by the great amount of carbon dioxide put into the atmosphere through the burning of fossil fuels is raising the ambient air temperature and those who have concluded that a cooler climate should be expected in the coming decades.² Among those holding the latter view is Nikolai A. Volkov, Chief of Ice Forecasting at the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in Leningrad, who announced in October 1976 that the Arctic has been growing steadily colder for the last 30 years. Since the early 1940s, the average annual temperature over the Kara Sea has dropped 3°C from -10 to -13. In farming regions, each degree centigrade drop cuts one week off the growing season, which can be of decisive importance to harvests.³

Having suggested that food shortages would increase the power of the United States in the world, the CIA study warned that in the "worst case," caused by a cooling of the global climate, the situation could become the source of new threats:

Where climate change caused great shortages of food despite United States exports, the potential risks to the United States would rise. There would be increasingly desperate attempts on the part of the militarily powerful but nonetheless hungry nations to get more grain any way they could. Massive migration backed by force would become a very live issue. Nuclear blackmail is not inconceivable. More likely, perhaps, would be ill-conceived efforts to undertake drastic cures which might be worse than the disease--e.g., efforts to change the climate by trying to melt the arctic ice cap.⁴

¹Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Political Research, *Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production, and Climate*, OPR-401, August 1974, pp. 2-3.

²Popular literature on food and climate is growing. Recent titles include John Gribbin, *Forecasts, Famines, and Freezes*, Stephen H. Schneider, *The Genesis Strategy*, and Erik P. Eckholm, *Losing Ground: Environmental Stress and World Food Prospects*.

³Robert C. Toth, "Arctic Region Cooling, Soviet Scientists Find," *The Los Angeles Times*, October 3, 1976.

⁴CIA, *Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production, and Climate*, p. 41. Also, Henry Weinstein, "C.I.A. Report

If the CIA analysts used perhaps too much technological imagination in trying to forecast the consequences of population outrunning means of subsistence, at least the U.S. government recognized the possibility of Malthusian contingencies. Both Soviet and Chinese spokesmen at the Bucharest and Rome conferences chose to ignore this threat. For instance, Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai N. Rodionov, chief of the Soviet delegation to the World Food Conference, stated that according to Soviet specialists "the world had enough land to feed 40 billion people, more than 10 times its present population,"¹ a whooping 14 percent increase over the figure the Soviets had used three months earlier in Bucharest.

The World Food Conference established a new 36-nation World Food Council, which was given the unrealistic task of coordinating the global war on hunger under the direction of the United Nations' Economic and Social Council, and with staff assistance from the FAO in Rome. The role of the new body was to be purely advisory, operating through multinational committees.

Initially, the Secretary General of the World Food Conference, Sayed Ahmed Marei, President of the People's Assembly of Egypt, had envisioned a World Food Authority, with a small staff, able in case of food emergencies anywhere in the world to move quickly, identify the dimensions of the problem, and organize assistance.² Failure to establish such a body could have been easily predicted. No realistic student of international affairs would expect sovereign states to delegate real authority to an international agency, even for as vital a task as the combat of widespread famines. Nevertheless, in keeping with the prevailing hypocrisy of international diplomacy, the Secretary General of the United Nations Food Conference proclaimed the conference a success. Sayed Ahmed Marei told a press conference that the

Says Worsening World Grain Shortages Could Give U.S. Great Power," *The New York Times*, March 17, 1975.

¹ William Robbins, "U.S. May Double Humanitarian Aid to Hungry Lands," *The New York Times*, November 9, 1974.

² William Robbins, "World Agency Proposed for the Fight on Hunger," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1974.

Rome meetings had ushered in "a new phase in the history of the world" on international cooperation, glossing over the fact that the new World Food Council had no authority to act independently and avoiding discussion of the failure to win pledges for the 10 million tons of food grains needed at that time by the countries "most seriously affected" by global food and energy shortages.¹

If agricultural production in developing countries continues to grow only at the present rate of 2.5 percent a year, the gap between the total production and the food requirements of developing countries will rise from 25 million to 85 million tons by 1985.² As Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders told the U.S. Senate, 85 million tons of grain annually is "an amount which exporters, mainly North America, could provide, but which would be virtually impossible to transport and finance on a sustained basis.... For the longer run the only solution is to accelerate production in the food deficit areas."³

A year later, the Central Intelligence Agency released a second, "worst case," study on the future global food situation. It predicted that climatic changes that have already occurred would reduce crop production and cause such widespread famine and starvation as to create global political and economic upheaval "beyond comprehension." According to the CIA estimate, grain shortfalls due to climatic changes would amount to 30 to 50 million metric tons in India, 50 metric tons in China, and 48 metric tons in the Soviet Union; Canada would lose 50 percent and the Common Market 25 to 30 percent of their productive capability.⁴ These shortfalls of 150 million tons of grain and drastically reduced harvests in the exporting countries could occur in the next decade. Despite such catastrophic prospects, a system of coordinated national

¹UPI dispatch in *The Los Angeles Times*, November 18, 1974.

²Address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to World Food Conference on November 5, 1974, *Department of State Bulletin*, December 16, 1974, p. 823.

³"Department Discusses Implementation of Recommendations of World Food Conference," *Department of State Bulletin*, May 19, 1975, p. 647.

⁴Associated Press, "C.I.A. Weather Study Cites Global Crisis," *The New York Times*, May 1, 1976.

reserve policies, proposed in early 1973 by the FAO,¹ is still not functioning, despite the intervening 1974 World Food Conference and the establishment of the World Food Council.

An authoritative *World Food and Nutrition Study* by the National Research Council, submitted to the President of the United States on June 20, 1977, makes it clear that there are no simple solutions to the problems of widespread hunger and malnutrition. After consulting 1500 experts from all over the world, the study concluded, in the words of Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, that "given the political will here and abroad, it should be possible, by the end of this century, to eliminate most of the hunger and malnutrition now associated with mass poverty."² The Steering Committee of the study, chaired by Harrison S. Brown of the California Institute of Technology, stressed that because of the complexity of the problem of alleviating hunger and malnutrition in the world "success will depend upon how effectively we undertake four major tasks: increasing the supply of the right kinds of food where it is needed, reducing poverty, improving the stability of food supplies, and decreasing the rate of population growth." Wisely avoiding recommendations concerning global social, economic, and political reforms, the Steering Committee concentrated its efforts on identifying high priority areas for research and development, based on their prospective effects on world hunger over the next few decades, and offered recommendations on national and international institutional arrangements and funding requirements for getting the work done. Unfortunately this highly rational approach will not prevent global food riots in the time frame of the 1980s.

THE ENCLOSURE OF THE OCEANS

The history of the Law of the Sea Conferences is another example of the global scope of the problems confronting mankind and its limited

¹ Lester R. Brown, "The Next Crisis? Food," *Foreign Policy*, No. 13, Winter 1973-74, p. 27.

² National Research Council, *World Food and Nutrition Study: The Potential Contributions of Research*, Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1977, pp. iv, xv, 2, 55, 128 (emphasis added).

capacity to solve them. The two conferences held under United Nations auspices in 1958 and 1960 had little to show for their efforts. The third conference began its substantive sessions in 1974. The legal system regulating use of the oceans dates to the early 17th century when Hugo Grotius in his *Mare Liberum* proclaimed that the oceans "can be neither seized nor enclosed." Rejecting the claim that the sea could be appropriated by the most powerful maritime states, Grotius wrote:

The sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of anyone and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.

Intensive exploitation of marine resources, facilitated by modern technology, is changing mankind's relations with the oceans. Capital-intensive, highly mechanized fishing fleets operating at great distances from their home ports are depleting the traditional fishing grounds of littoral states. Supertankers are bringing the threat of oil spills to narrow straits and even to inland waters. Offshore oil and gas extraction and prospects for the collection of minerals from the deep seabed have prompted industrially less advanced countries to demand a share of these resources, although they lack capital and technology for such operations.

Some 156 countries are negotiating for the creation of a new legal order for the 70 percent of the planet's surface covered by oceans. An "Informal Single Negotiating Text" was adopted during the second substantive session held in Geneva in 1975.¹ It proposes a 12-mile limit to the territorial sea, with transit rights for all ships and aircraft through or over straits used for international navigation, a 200-mile "exclusive economic zone" in which coastal states would have full jurisdiction over natural resources, and an "international regime" for the high seas (beyond 200 miles) and for the deep seabed and its resources.

¹United Nations Third Conference on The Law of the Sea: *Informal Single Negotiating Text*, document A/CONF. 62/WP8, Parts I, II and III, May 7, 1975; document A/CONF. 62/WP9, Part IV, July 21, 1975.

The negotiations leading to that text constitute an example of the inability of the present world order, based on state sovereignty, to adopt global policies detrimental to the narrowly defined short-run interests of a multitude of countries and of special interest groups within those countries.

On August 8, 1967, Arvid Pardo, at that time Ambassador from Malta to the United Nations, proposed that the seabed and ocean floor underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction be declared "the common heritage of mankind," not subject to appropriation for exclusive national use. A new international agency was to act as trustee of the seabed and exploit its resources, with the proceeds to be used to assist the economic growth of developing countries.¹

The United States, after intense political discussions seeking to determine national policy on the novel issue of seabed resources, called on May 23, 1970, for the renunciation of national claims to seabed resources beyond the depth of 200 meters and for the exploitation of those resources in accordance with new principles. Coastal states would administer exploitation to the edge of the continental shelf as trustees for the international community in return for a share of the revenues, while international machinery would regulate exploitation beyond the continental margin and collect substantial royalties to be used for economic assistance to developing countries.²

By the time these general principles, incorporated by a U.S. government interagency committee into a "United Nations Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area," were presented to the United Nations Seabed Committee on August 3, 1970, pressure from American petroleum and mining interests had eliminated the concept of a trusteeship for the resources of the continental margin beyond the depth of 200 meters. Third World delegations to the United Nations August 1970 Geneva meeting suspected ulterior motives behind the initial proposals of the United States, thus providing unexpected tactical support to American industrial interests against the draft treaty. The combination of

¹United Nations General Assembly, document A/6695, August 18, 1967.

²Ann L. Hollick, "Bureaucrats at Sea," in Ann L. Hollick and Robert E. Osgood (eds.), *New Era of Ocean Politics*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, pp. 37-38.

bureaucratic politics, domestic interest group pressure, and lack of international support resulted in a gradual shift of the official American position from giving primacy to global interests to the customary one of protecting national interests.

Five years later, after the Law of the Sea Conference had concluded its second substantive session in May 1975 in Geneva, some Third World delegates confessed that the original U.S. proposals for sharing the wealth of the oceans appeared in retrospect to have been "very generous and unselfish"¹ but had been rejected or ignored because any initiative of a superpower was suspect to the Third World.

Meanwhile, negotiations on a new regime for the oceans had moved in the opposite direction from the initial concept of treating the resources of the seabed as "the common heritage of mankind." Between 1967 and 1973, 81 states had made more than 230 new jurisdictional claims, some as extreme as Brazil's unilateral proclamation of a 200-mile territorial sea.

During the first substantive session of the Law of the Sea Conference, held in Caracas, Venezuela, from June 20 to August 29, 1974, there was a trend to extend the jurisdiction of coastal states far into the high seas. The idea of a territorial sea of 12 miles and of an "exclusive economic zone" beyond the territorial sea up to a total maximum distance of 200 miles came to be viewed as "the keystone of the compromise solution favored by the majority of the states participating in the conference."² It is virtually certain that, if a treaty is eventually adopted, the living and mineral resources of the 200-mile zone will be recognized as part of the patrimony of the respective coastal states. Only the juridical nature of the exclusive economic zone is still to be determined; the United States insists that the waters beyond 12 miles should remain part of the high seas, many other

¹James P. Brown, "Law or Anarchy?" *The New York Times*, June 3, 1975.

²Statement by the Chairman of the Second Committee, Ambassador from Venezuela Andres Aguilar, quoted in *Department of State Bulletin*, September 23, 1974, p. 393.

coastal states favor a new *sui generis* regime, and a few radical coastal states demand full sovereignty to the 200-mile limit.¹

The outcome of these negotiations, however important to freedom of navigation, will not alter the fact that 35 percent of the ocean space that was previously regarded as "the common heritage of mankind" will probably be appropriated by coastal states. It is estimated that this "exclusive economic zone" contains "virtually all oil and gas resources, 95 percent of the harvestable living resources, and even perhaps a significant proportion of...manganese nodules."²

When the fifth session of the Law of the Sea Conference closed in New York on September 17, 1976, it was deadlocked by a dispute over exploitation of the mineral wealth of the deep seabed. Few participants expressed optimism about the chances for resolving the controversy at the session to be held in May 1977.³ A last minute effort by Secretary of State Kissinger to achieve a compromise with the Group of 77 failed because of the opposition of the more radical Third World countries, such as Algeria.

The United States had proposed a "double-access" system, allowing both private or nationally owned corporations and a new International Seabed Authority to extract mineral nodules from the deep seabed beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. The corporations would pay the International Seabed Authority a share of their profits. The special inducement offered to make this mixed system of exploitation acceptable to the Third World was that the United States would provide financial and technological assistance so that the International Seabed Authority could start work concurrently with private and nationally owned corporations.

The American proposal was generous both with regard to willingness to share deep-sea mining technology not available to other countries

¹ Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *Hearing on New York Session of the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference*, May 20, 1976, p. 28.

² John Temple Swing, "Who Will Own the Oceans?" *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, p. 531.

³ Kathleen Teltsch, "U.N. Law of Sea Meeting Recesses, Still Deadlocked on Mineral Riches," *The New York Times*, September 18, 1976.

and in accepting the concept of global accountability for the resources of the deep seabed, although its superior naval power would allow the United States to reject interference with its activities on the high seas. Yet the concept of equal exploitation rights was not accepted by the Third World, despite warnings by Kissinger on September 1, 1976, that if the American offer were rejected "we will find ourselves in the regrettable and tragic situation where at sea--just as previously on land--unilateralism will reign supreme."¹ In plain words, this means that, confronted by intransigent Third World nationalism, the United States may abandon efforts to reach agreement on a new regime for the oceans and use its advanced technology, under the protection of its own military forces, to extract some of the mineral riches of the deep seabed, the estimated worth of which is about \$3 trillion.²

The Law of the Sea Conference has so far been unable to solve other complex problems affecting the management of an interdependent globe, such as the protection of the oceans against pollution and the regime of marine research in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, where oceanographers estimate that "75 percent of the important research for the rest of this century needs to be conducted."³ These problems offer convincing proof that global management systems requiring radical changes in the current world order are not likely to be established by the 1980s because of the many powerful forces supporting the status quo or seeking to broaden the sphere of exclusive national jurisdiction of sovereign states.

Within the United States, a generous initial American response to an idealistic proposal in the United Nations was turned around by the concerted efforts of important economic pressure groups, who skillfully influenced the decisionmaking process of bureaucratic politics. The fate of the 1970 American offer to subordinate the interests of the United States to those of the global community is meaningful. Similar

¹Don Shannon, "Kissinger Fails to Sell Proposal on Mining Seabed," *The Los Angeles Times*, September 4, 1976.

²"U.S. Pledges Sea-Mining Funds," *The Washington Post*, September 2, 1976.

³"Who Will Own the Oceans?" p. 544.

resistance is bound to be generated within other sovereign states whenever the requirements of international concerted action threaten national interests or reduce national benefits.

At the global level, the past five sessions of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (from 1973 to 1976) offer conclusive proof that sovereign states will only act in concert when their specific national goals converge. For instance, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, which share global military and economic interests, insisted on free transit through international waterways such as Gibraltar and the Malacca Straits, while 52 landlocked and "geographically disadvantaged" countries joined forces to win transit rights, participation in the exploitation of the living resources of the adjoining coastal states' exclusive economic zones, and a share in the revenue from the mineral resources exploited seawards of the 200-mile limit, out to the edge of the continental margin.¹ This vocal and influential group of landlocked countries, led by Austria, has wielded influence disproportionate to its power and the size of its total population; if it remains united, it could prevent the adoption of a treaty requiring a two-thirds majority. The bloc cuts across old East-West and new North-South alignments and includes "such unlikely partners as Switzerland and Uganda, Singapore and Poland, East Germany and West Germany."²

In contrast, the two protagonists of the North-South conflict, the OECD and the Group of 77, were divided among themselves along lines created by particular geographic and economic circumstances. Some of the industrial democracies lagging in deep sea mining technology were eager to curtail the future activities of American mining corporations, and some of the Third World countries opposed the desires of their landlocked neighbors to share in the wealth of the oceans.

A truly globalist viewpoint, seeking to optimize the benefits that mankind as a whole might derive from the oceans, had no champions at the

¹ John McLin, "The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference: Geneva," *Field Staff Reports, West Europe Series*, Vol. X, No. 2, May 1974, p. 4.

² Paul Hofmann, "Laws of the Sea Remain as Elusive as Ever," *The New York Times*, August 29, 1976.

Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. Nobody presented a realistic and compelling action plan for the utilization of "the common heritage of mankind" for the common good.

TOWARD A TRANSITIONAL CRISIS

I believe that my conclusions about the most likely state of the international environment in the 1980s are the logical extrapolation of the trends I have discerned and documented. They run counter to my hopes and moral preferences. I agree with Barrington Moore, Jr., who wrote a few years ago:

The evidence is reasonably clear that human beings do not want a life of suffering, at least not for its own sake. Such evidence has led me to adopt as a working premise the moral position that human society ought to be organized in such a way as to eliminate useless suffering. I also very much want society to allow and indeed encourage human beings to find their own forms of happiness in their own ways so long as the search does not cause others to suffer.¹

I share Moore's "very somber sense of the world to come," although his book was concerned primarily with "the prospects for any transformation of American society by purely peaceful and democratic means."² My concern is with the future dynamics of North-South relations and with the obvious incapacity of the international community to develop within the next decade management systems capable of handling the many menacing aspects of global interdependence.

I found my pessimistic conclusions reinforced by the recent works of Richard A. Falk, who has played a leading role in the World Order Models Project. Assisted by a distinguished Sponsoring and Policy Review Committee, Falk studied the requirements and prospects for the implementation of a "preferred world" model, based on the promotion and realization of certain key values:

¹ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1970, p. 5.

² "Reflections on the Causes...," p. 193.

- o The minimization of large-scale collective violence.
- o The maximization of social and economic well-being.
- o The realization of fundamental human rights and conditions of political justice.
- o The rehabilitation and maintenance of environmental quality,
including the conservation of resources.¹

Unlike other idealistic thinkers who propose utopian systems of world order but do not discuss how to achieve the transition from "here" to "there," Falk gave considerable thought to the question of implementation. He and his associates tried to reach conclusions not only about the feasibility of their proposals in the indeterminate future, but also about the time frame within which world order changes could be realistically expected. They distinguished between the cumulative impact of unplanned change, by which over a period of years "a variety of technological, ecological, and political changes have modified the world order system which evolved from the [1648 Peace of] Westphalia system of sovereign states" and "planned and value-directed change that deliberately facilitates the shift from one system of world order to another."² There is an appealing realism in Falk's approach:

If there is no plausible way to reach the promised land, its presentation as a solution becomes merely an opiate to be overlooked altogether, or else a vision whose unattainability enhances the staying-power of adherents to the present world order setting.³

A sequence of "historical time points" is postulated, from 1974 to 1984, then 1994, finally completing the transition from the state system to a subsequent world order system by 2004. The sequence merely illustrates the necessity for specific political action in each stage, as a prerequisite for the following stage, with the caveat that there is no empirical basis for the assumption of time intervals of equal length.

¹Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds*, New York: The Free Press, 1975, p. 11.

²Page 279.

³Page 286.

Starting from the assumption that "no world order solution which presupposes the substantial modification of the state system can be achieved unless the advocates of the new system are aligned with important social and political forces within the existing world structure,"¹ Falk assumes that in the first period (the "Era of Consciousness"), roughly from 1974 to 1984, the main field of action will be the raising of political consciousness: "It will be desirable for governmental leaders to attain a high degree of consensus on world order problems and goals."²

The "mobilization of change-oriented forces" throughout the world in the second period (the "Era of Mobilization"), from 1984 to 1994, presupposes the "emergence of a new consensus on the character of world order problems and on the broad contours of a solution."³

The third period (the "Era of Transformation"), from perhaps 1994 on, will be initiated after political consciousness is crystallized in support of the new world order and mobilization for action is completed.⁴

Falk anticipates serious obstacles even after 1994 (or whenever the first two time intervals have run their course):

We do not foresee any kind of occasion comparable to a formal constitutional conference of national governments and other principal world actors, nor, on the other hand, do we rule it out altogether. We foresee a period of confrontation....⁵

Conflict between the supporters of the prevailing state system and those of the new world is expected to continue until at least 1994, probably longer. Falk also expects "various kinds of regression" after 1994 and "tension in the atmosphere accompanying dramatic reforms and the consolidation of structural adjustments."⁵ He cautions:

¹A *Study of Future Worlds*, p. 277.

²Page 287.

³Page 292.

⁴Page 294.

⁵Page 296.

Only in the 1970s, after more than twenty-five years of post-war experiment, is a European consciousness emerging to complement specific national consciousnesses in the countries of Western Europe. This shift has finally taken place in the context of two destructive intra-European wars, pressure of a political kind from the Soviet Union, and pressure of an economic kind from the United States. Old patterns of identification do not give way easily, nor do power/authority structures dissolve quickly or voluntarily.¹

Falk concludes that even if the transition from the present world order system to the one preferred by the American group of the World Order Models Project proceeds on schedule, "it will nevertheless be important to bear in mind the likelihood that problems of pollution, poverty, privation and strife may grow worse," at least until the late 1990s, which "makes the passage to the future replete with risks and costs."² Although he is one of the intellectual leaders of the World Order Models Project, Falk is far from sanguine about the prospects of that endeavor:

We want to organize a line of thinking that could undergird a global reform movement. We do not expect this thinking to prevail in the future, but we are convinced that unless it challenges regressive world order orientations, the prospects for positive adaptation to world order challenges are virtually nil.³

My pessimism is further reinforced by a major economic analysis of the future conducted recently under the auspices of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. An international team of economists led by Nobel prize winner Wassily Leontief concluded, after three years of study, that the gap between the rich and the poor countries could be reduced by half by the year 2000. But to achieve these results, inadequate targets for economic growth in the developing countries have been set for the United Nations Second Development Decade. The income gap between developed and developing countries could be

¹A *Study of Future Worlds*, p. 303.

²Pages 318-319.

³Page 330.

reduced by the amount postulated in the Leontief study only if 30 to 40 percent of gross national product were used for capital investment by the developing countries.

The report on *The Future of the World Economy* asserts that such policies would require major structural reforms in the social and political organization of Third World countries:

A steady increase in the investment ratio to these levels may necessitate drastic measures of economic policy in the field of taxation and credit, increasing the role of public investment and the public sector in production and the infrastructure. Measures leading to a more equitable income distribution are needed to increase the effectiveness of such policies. Significant social and institutional changes would have to accompany these policies. Investment resources coming from abroad would be important but are secondary as compared to the internal sources.¹

It is very unlikely that the oligarchies controlling the governments of the Third World countries will voluntarily adopt drastic fiscal measures against themselves, implement policies of more equitable income distribution, and practice austerity to achieve the level of savings required for capital investments of the order of 30 to 40 percent of GNP.

Governments based on rigid political controls and mass mobilization have found very high rates of capital investment difficult to sustain, even with the help of a large body of dedicated revolutionary party cadres, as in the People's Republic of China. Third World countries without strong totalitarian parties will find it even more difficult to achieve the significant social and institutional changes that Leontief and his associates consider indispensable prerequisites for greatly accelerated economic growth.

The second condition required to reduce by half the gap between rich and poor countries is the closing of the payments gap that accelerated development will cause. The United Nations report expects it to materialize

¹ Wassily Leontief et al., *The Future of the World Economy--A United Nations Study*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 11(f).

by introducing changes into the economic relations between developing and developed countries, as perceived by the Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order--namely, by stabilizing commodity markets, stimulating exports of manufactures from the developing countries, increasing financial transfers and so on.¹

Prospects for the establishment of a New International Economic Order do not appear very promising, even though most of the Third World governments that would benefit therefrom are conservative and have close political, economic, and military ties with the industrial democracies. If these governments were to be supplanted by radical-nationalist regimes, hostile to Western capitalism, the chances for harmonious co-operation between developed and developing countries would be further reduced, while the likelihood of a militant coalition of Third World radical regimes against the industrial democracies would be increased.

There seems to be an inherent vicious circle imbedded in the proposals of the study group led by Leontief. The oligarchies in power in most of the Third World are not likely to give up voluntarily the privileges that must be sacrificed to achieve the high level of capital investments recommended by the United Nations report. This situation increases the probability that the political dynamics of many Third World countries will result in radical regimes. New radical régimes have a strong propensity to adopt policies hostile to foreign capital, even if at a later stage, after they become more mature and self-confident, they seek again economic partnerships with the industrial democracies. But in retaliation against their hostile opening gambits, which usually violate past agreements between foreign investors and the host country, economic relations are curtailed, preventing the achievement of the second condition postulated by the United Nations experts--the closing of the payments gap.

The inherent antagonism between the social and political conditions required in Third World countries for domestic capital investments of 30 to 40 percent of GNP and the economic climate that those countries would have to maintain for the industrial democracies to help improve their

¹*The Future of the World Economy*, p. 11(i).

balance of payments cannot be easily resolved. But Leontief and his associates are convinced that the targets they set for the year 2000 can be achieved only if both conditions are met simultaneously:

To insure accelerated development two general conditions are necessary: first, far-reaching internal changes of a social, political and institutional character in the developing countries, and second, significant changes in the world economic order. Accelerated development leading to a substantial reduction of the income gap between the developing and developed countries can only be achieved through a combination of both these conditions. Clearly, each of them taken separately is insufficient, but when developed hand in hand, they will be able to produce the desired outcome.¹

For practical purposes, *The Future of the World Economy* offers no solutions, despite its impressive evidence that "no insurmountable physical barriers exist within the 20th century to the accelerated development of the developing regions."

But unlike the physical barriers, those of an institutional, social, and political character are probably not surmountable within the next decade. Although a few countries may be able to develop rapidly within the setting of the global market economy, most people living in the Third World are more likely to experience as deprivation the compound impact of the forces unleashed by the scientific and industrial revolutions, until the time when the transitional crisis will have run its course.

That the prospects for a rapid solution of the economic problems of the Third World are dim was confirmed by another study, released late in 1976, conducted by Nobel laureate economist Jan Tinbergen of the Netherlands. A team of twenty experts, half from advanced industrial countries and half from the Third World, devoted two years, under the auspices of the Club of Rome, to the preparation of a report entitled *Reshaping the International Order*.² The RIO Project confirmed that the gap between the poorest countries and the industrialized

¹*The Future of the World Economy*, p. 11(1).

²Jan Tinbergen, *RIO: Reshaping the International Order*, New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1976.

nations has worsened between 1960 and 1975, in terms of real purchasing power, from a 1 to 10 ratio to one of 1 to 14.

The report proposes among other remedies that the developing countries utilize more effectively their own resources by increasing agricultural productivity, by conducting a more efficient birth control program, by utilizing more fully their human capital, and by changing their investment priorities to benefit primarily their poorest people. Obviously this prescription also requires a level of political determination and leadership that only major structural social changes can generate and sustain.

Besides these domestic policies, the Tinbergen group recommends that aid of not less than 0.7 percent of the GNP of the rich countries should become a guaranteed input into the budgetary planning cycle of Third World countries. Tinbergen has advocated for some time that aid be treated as an "international solidarity tax," and the RIO proposal is an implementation of that idea. In addition to such direct contribution from the governments of developed countries, Tinbergen also recommends that multinational corporations pay taxes into an international fund rather than to national governments.

The authors of the RIO report argue that eventually a global treasury department should be created, collecting international taxes and obtaining revenue from the exploitation of natural resources such as the minerals of the deep seabed. Future global management systems should also include centralized planning of economic growth and resource exploitation, an international central bank, a strengthened UNCTAD, a global energy research and development agency, a global arms control agency, a central grains stock, and a global food authority.

The French newspaper *Le Monde*, after summarizing the RIO report, remarked that "these globalist proposals will surely elicit skeptical smiles" and added:

Present planetary conditions offer no indication, to say the least, what future "global planning" would look like. It is not enough to be logical, to design rational ways to help man get out of his exhausting Capernaum. Will governments let wise men influence their decisions? It's

an old question, which is far from answered even on the smaller European scale.¹

The proposals of Falk, Leontief, and Tinbergen share the assumption that rational plans, developed by persons of good will, can be realized through global schemes of social engineering. In the light of numerous 20th century social experiments at the national and local levels, the feasibility of global planning is open to doubt. Also to be answered is the question whether the effect of global planning on individual freedom and the danger of adverse unintended consequences of social engineering on a global scale would outweigh the expected benefits. Such a discussion exceeds the scope of this essay, and it is also not really necessary for an argument limited to the assertion that the 1980s threaten to be a period of global turbulence, confronting the United States with novel national security problems.

The World Order Models Project, the UN study on *The Future of the World Economy*, and the Club of Rome's RIO Project were all conducted by scholars with strong humanitarian convictions, who did not hesitate to advocate major changes of the existing world order through social engineering. Yet even if their proposals were to be fully implemented, none of them believed that significant results could be achieved by the end of the next decade.

Alternatively, incremental changes, inherent in the continuation of current trends, cannot result in major transformations either in the Third World or in the management of global problems by the end of the next decade. Therefore, the probability is not negligible that the cumulative impact of the East-West conflict, the North-South conflict, and global mismanagement could result in the breakdown of the present world order.

Because the Soviet Union is already close to achieving military parity with the United States, it seems plausible to assume that the test of wills between the two superpowers is more likely to occur in the next decade than at a later date. If the Soviet Union does not succeed in establishing global primacy in the 1980s because the United

¹Pierre Drouin, "Aménager la planète," *Le Monde*, October 22, 1976.

States proves that it has the will not to yield, then it becomes increasingly likely that the two superpowers will agree on a genuine modus vivendi before the end of the century.

The North-South conflict, to a large extent an extension of the campaign for the liquidation of Western imperialism, will either grow in intensity in the next decade, while common memories sustain political solidarity, or cease being significant if the most successful Third World countries lose interest in the movement because their economic relations with the industrial democracies are more rewarding than political solidarity with the poorer countries of the Third World.

There are also reasons to believe that exponential growth of global population, of demand for energy and other natural resources, of pollution of the life-sustaining systems in a setting of unbridled national rivalries could in another decade overload the carrying capacity of the human institutions inherited from earlier ages and create generalized chaos. Were this to happen, it would be more difficult to manage crises resulting from the East-West conflict, the North-South conflict, and especially crises at intersections between these two sources of turbulence. Under such circumstances, the international environment of the 1980s could become much harsher than it is at present. Nowadays, despite numerous conflicts between states, an overwhelming proportion of all international transactions are conducted peacefully, in accordance with established rules. The extent to which the rule of law is followed in the world today tends to be underestimated because of the intense media coverage given to isolated instances of world order breakdown and violence.

If the international situation deteriorates gradually, so that a decade from now there is disregard for agreed principles of international conduct and arbitrary force is used, it would be reasonable to assert that the world order had broken down and that mankind was in the throes of a Hobbesian "war of each against all." In such circumstances, the United States may feel compelled to use force to defend limited national interests. That it will be possible to do so efficiently is far from self-evident, because of the climate of domestic and international opinion and the growing diffusion of military power.

IV. THE FUTURE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

Public debates preceding the November 1976 U.S. general elections revealed a new consensus on the need to deny the Soviet Union military superiority, as well as a considerable uncertainty on how the United States should use military force in peripheral conflicts. Discussions centered on cases such as the recent Angolan power struggle, in which the Soviet Union and the Union of South Africa intervened on opposite sides, or the hypothetical case of Soviet aggression in a future Yugoslav succession crisis.

The novel challenges discussed in this essay are less well understood than the Soviet threat. A comprehensive range of responses has not been formulated. Because of their technical complexity, lack of dramatic-emotional impact, and apparent absence of urgency, the issues that could become explosive in the 1980s receive relatively little public attention or national debate.

An advanced, sophisticated industrial society like the United States is geared to global interdependence. It imports and exports natural resources, manufactured goods, information, ideas, entertainment, and people in ever-increasing quantities, of greater and greater variety, at a more and more rapid pace. Continental North America is also well endowed for autarky. Its expanse and variety can sustain a rich and rewarding life for its inhabitants. But to live in a closed society Americans would have to accept, whether rapidly or gradually, basic structural changes in their political institutions, economic system, and forms of social organization.

Any confining changes are not likely to be easily accepted by a nation conditioned to global tastes and interests. The U.S. government might find itself under popular pressure to "keep the world open for Americans." It might be asked to maintain global respect for this nation and its citizens, allowing Americans to pursue their interests in business, science, religion, sports, or tourism even in a harsh and turbulent international environment. Which individual and corporate American interests should be protected in case of global anarchy and

chaos are not self-evident. If established international standards of behavior were to break down, should the U.S. government be prepared to project its power into all parts of the world where Americans wish to travel, trade, study, or engage in any other normal and peaceful activities in order to protect them? Where should one draw the line?

The economic implications of modern conventional warfare raise considerable doubts about the cost effectiveness of military force as an instrument for the protection of any interests other than defense against direct attacks on the territory and population of the United States. Survival is outside the scope of cost-benefit analysis, but in all other instances the cost of conventional military operations may exceed by a substantial margin the value of the interests or assets to be protected.

Besides financial costs, a great power must also take into account political costs. If the use it makes of military power is not effective, its credibility suffers, both in the eyes of those who count on its protection and with its potential enemies, whereas ruthlessly successful operations risk alienating those concerned with the moral dimensions of international life, a factor of much greater importance to democratic than to authoritarian governments.

The decision to use force to protect limited national interests should not be made by a democracy unless several conditions are met, including lack of remedies through the legal and political processes of the international community, a reasonable balance between the material and human costs of the intended military operations and the human and material benefits expected from their success, good odds that the effect on international public opinion will not be detrimental to the nation's moral and political standing and, of course, public support.

Should the United States, for instance, plan to protect its foreign investments by force? American foreign assets at the end of 1974 totaled \$264.6 billion, according to the Department of Commerce. Of that amount, \$68.8 billion were private long-term and short-term assets in Third World countries, whereas \$141.6 billion were private long-term and short-term

assets in Canada, Western Europe, Japan, and international organizations.¹ Let's assume that by the 1980s the Third World has achieved perfect solidarity and takes simultaneous action against all American assets under the control of its governments. Let's also assume that the \$68.4 billion assets of 1974 had doubled 10 years later through new investments and reinvestments of profits. How much should the United States spend on military operations that may or may not safeguard assets worth \$150 billion, which is about the cost of the limited war fought in Vietnam?

Because the high cost of conventional military operations may exceed the value of overseas interests needing protection and because the Vietnam war has raised serious doubts about the capacity of a major power to impose its will on a determined small country, the question how to apply force in future support of various national interests requires bold and imaginative new thinking. Without sound new doctrines, it may be irrational to use military force for any purpose other than the defense of the territory of the United States against direct aggression. This could mean that the United States would cease playing the role of a stabilizing superpower even though no alternative mechanism exists to maintain international order and facilitate peaceful evolution toward a global rule of law. The crucial question, which will have to be addressed realistically, is whether a war can be won or a limited campaign conducted in a reasonable time span and at an acceptable cost in lives and material resources, given such constraints as may be considered politically and morally necessary.

There is a probability that conflicts enticing the use of force by the United States will occur in the coming decade. Medium and small powers in various parts of the world may create situations that the United States would not accept. Obvious examples are denial of access to certain natural resources, free transit through certain straits, mistreatment of American individuals or corporations in a given country, or attacks on friends and allies of the United States. Furthermore, partial or total collapse of the international order could create

¹ *International Economic Report of the President, March 1976*, Table 46, p. 161.

intolerable conditions involving massacres for economic, racial, or religious reasons, or brutal scramble for resources during crises brought about by bad harvests, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, or other calamities.

THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY POWER

In the absence of international machinery to deal with such situations, the United States might be tempted to intervene, alone or with other concerned powers, in defense of its national interests or on behalf of broader humanitarian causes. Although superficially reminiscent of crises from an earlier period when the major powers have acted without hesitation as self-appointed custodians of the rule of law, some future emergencies could be very different both in terms of the international political repercussions of ill-conceived acts of intervention and in terms of new power relations between previously very unequal states, brought about by the changing character of military operations. Revolutionary precision-guided weapons may spread widely in the next 10 to 15 years. The world's major weapon manufacturers are exporting both end items and defense industry plants, thus constantly improving the military capability of countries that would otherwise lack the capacity to arm themselves. Proliferation could, in the 1980s, increase the number of countries in possession of nuclear weapons and confront the United States with the decision of deterring the use or threat of such weapons in local and regional conflicts.

Continuous military technology transfers, professional training made available to other countries by the major military powers of the world, and massive export of equipment are changing the global military balance. The unintended consequences of American, Soviet, and other military assistance programs are not fully apparent yet, but the cumulative effect of these efforts may be of fundamental importance within another decade, when the diffusion of military power will be much further advanced than it is today.

Louis J. Halle wrote a thoughtful article a few years ago entitled "Does War Have a Future?". He noted that war as an instrument of policy was losing its legitimacy in democratic countries, as witnessed by British

opposition to the Suez campaign and American opposition to the war in Vietnam. Three factors account, according to Halle, for this change in attitude: First, the destructiveness of the instruments of war has constantly increased in the six centuries since the longbow was introduced in the Battle of Crécy in 1346, making the consequences of war unacceptably high. Second, wars can no longer be fought in isolation, as was the Franco-Prussian War a century ago. Any major war, even if initially fought with conventional weapons and limited geographically, could spread and escalate into a nuclear war, regardless of the original intentions of the belligerents. Third, the concept of sovereign equality of states, regardless of their size and strength, has taken firm hold since it was first advanced in 1907 at the Second Peace Conference in The Hague, in the context of outlawing the use of force for the international collection of debts.

Halle believes that the deliberate resort to general warfare is ruled out for "as long as our civilization itself survives" because of the continued destructiveness of the instruments of war and the impossibility of isolating wars. But he doubts that the principle of non-intervention will last:

The growing egalitarianism that inhibits military intervention by a great power within the jurisdiction of small states seems to me alike less compelling and less to be counted on in terms of permanence.¹

This conclusion is based on the expectation that great powers will take military action against small states if their citizens are being slaughtered or their property systematically destroyed, especially if the small states are within their sphere of influence or in other areas where the danger of escalation and great power confrontation is not too great. While believing that "the day of general wars, directly involving great powers on both sides, may also be past," Halle does not see an end to the use of military power:

¹Louis J. Halle, "Does War Have a Future?" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, p. 31.

I foresee that powers will resort to military intervention within their own spheres of influence, and elsewhere when the danger seems not too great. I foresee military raids, on the ground or in the air, ended almost as soon as begun. I foresee skirmishes, soon suppressed. I foresee that military airplanes of one power, perhaps flying too close to the frontiers of another, will be shot down. I foresee that ships will be captured or sunk by military action. In sum, I foresee widespread and continual disorder, with its accompaniment of inhumanity and its tendency toward barbarism. I foresee barbarism.¹

Like Halle, I am inclined to believe that the diffusion of military power and the growing reluctance of the industrial democracies to use force in defense of their national interests will increase the propensity of medium and small powers, especially in the Third World, to resort to violence when their interests clash with those of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. This assumption becomes particularly plausible if the Third World continues to be frustrated in its attempts to escape from the bonds of poverty and the international community remains incapable of developing efficient global management systems. Violence could become an endemic expression of social tensions, without seeking any particular end results, creating indeed barbarism.

The extensive use of violence could also become purposeful as an instrument in the protracted bargaining between North and South or as the instrument of terrorist groups seeking to destroy international order under the misguided assumption that "worse is better." In either case, the assets of the industrial democracies and their citizens abroad could become the targets of these acts of violence on a much larger scale than in the last two decades. Would these highly developed countries, in a deteriorating global environment, resort to acts of retaliation similar to Israeli aerial attacks on the Palestinian terrorists' staging areas in neighboring Arab countries or to their raid on Entebbe in distant Uganda? A chain reaction of terror and counterterror could speed up the destruction of the fragile international legal order and

¹"Does War Have a Future?" p. 34.

further the regression into barbarism, without necessarily benefiting either side.

The international arrangements set up in 1945 have been unable to play a decisive role as a peace-keeping instrument in the past 30 years. They are not likely to be more efficient in the next 15 years, especially in dealing with North-South conflicts, as long as the United Nations remains dominated by a Third World majority.

In the developing countries, leadership could shift to activist radical-nationalist elites, predisposed to confrontation rather than conciliation both by domestic political requirements and by the impact they have on each other as peer groups. The unwillingness of the United Nations General Assembly to adopt a resolution against international terrorism is a significant portent. The question of international terrorism was placed on the agenda of the 1973 General Assembly but never debated, ostensibly because of a lack of time. The following year it was placed again on the agenda with primary emphasis on the causes that lead to acts of terrorism rather than on means to deter such acts, yet still without practical results.¹ The issue is still pending.

Assuming that the United Nations will remain paralyzed as a conflict-solving and peace-keeping organization, the United States will either have to make successive concessions to the growing demands and pressures of other countries and perhaps even of private activist groups, or to resist such pressures using the various means at the nation's disposal, which will require the capacity and willingness to use military force as the last resort.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1973 OIL EMBARGO

The possible role of force in conflicts between the United States and Third World countries has been discussed publicly in the aftermath of the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo and may have received closer attention in military circles after the successful Israeli commando operation at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. It raises very different issues from those concerning deterrence of the Soviet Union or other major powers,

¹Paul Hoffman, "Terrorism or Liberation Struggle? Violence Begets Many New Nations," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1974.

as well as from the limited wars fought by American forces in Korea and Vietnam.

When the possible use of force in the event of another Arab oil embargo was mentioned by Secretary of State Kissinger in an interview published in the January 13, 1975, issue of *Business Week* and his position was endorsed by President Ford in a news conference on January 21, 1975, these brief and carefully qualified official comments caused outrage in OPEC countries and were received with skepticism in the rest of the Third World, where the dominant reaction was that the Americans were bluffing. Meeting in Algiers from March 4 to 6, 1975, the Conference of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the OPEC Member Countries issued a "Solemn Declaration," in which they reacted explicitly to the American threats:

[The Sovereigns and Heads of State] denounce any grouping of consumer nations with the aim of confrontation, and condemn any plan or strategy designed for aggression, economic or military, by such grouping or otherwise against any OPEC Member Country.

In view of such threats the Sovereigns and Heads of State reaffirm the solidarity that unites their countries in the defence of the legitimate rights of their peoples and hereby declare their readiness, within the framework of that solidarity, to take immediate and effective measures in order to counteract such threats with a united response whenever the need arises, notably in the case of aggression.¹

Meanwhile, other high officials including Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger commented on the possible use of force against oil producing countries. The media picked up the theme and amplified it. A lengthy article by a well-known American specialist in international relations, Robert W. Tucker of Johns Hopkins University, appeared within days after the Secretary of State's interview advocating the use of force against the Arab oil producers, creating the impression that an orchestrated campaign of intimidation was being organized by the U.S. government.

¹ Conference of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the OPEC Member Countries, "Solemn Declaration," Algiers, March 4-6, 1975, OPEC/S1/1 Rev. 1, p. 3 (mimeo).

Tucker argued that the United States should use force not only to solve the oil crisis but also to reestablish the "credibility of force" as an instrument of international order. A spate of comments followed in the daily press and in various periodicals about the moral issues raised by the proposal to use force for the solution of contemporary international conflicts. Tucker asked, "Is military intervention technically feasible?" Answering affirmatively, he proposed that the United States occupy an area

from Kuwait down along the coastal region of Saudi Arabia to Qatar....It is this mostly shallow coastal strip--less than 400 miles in length--that provides 40 percent of present OPEC production and that has by far the world's largest proven reserves (over 50 percent of total OPEC reserves and 40 percent of world reserves). Since it has no substantial centers of population and is without trees, its effective control does not bear even remote comparison with the experience of Vietnam.¹

Technical arguments against the military feasibility of this operation were anticipated and rejected by Tucker in his article. The Russians would not intervene because "they still lack the naval forces needed for effective interposition in the Persian Gulf." The destruction of oil wells and supporting facilities by the Arabs would either be prevented by "a swift operation" or could be overcome in "three or four months or possibly less," as the Arabs would be incapable of "the thoroughness of the destruction wrought by German forces during World War II as they withdrew from the East."

The rhetoric did not sound convincing. It got worse when Tucker, instead of presenting a reasoned argument why he thought that armed intervention in the Arabian Peninsula was a militarily sound proposition, resorted to sophistc arguments against his putative critics:

Given the American force structure and the experience we possess, however, why is it unreasonable to insist that

¹ Robert W. Tucker, "Oil: The Issue of American Intervention," *Commentary*, January 1975, p. 25.

the burden of proof rests upon those who insist we lack the military capability to intervene successfully?¹

Tucker apparently misunderstood the problem. The primary issue was not whether the United States had the military capability to occupy some Arabian oil fields, but whether it could achieve the political and economic results it sought, namely an uninterrupted flow of oil to the industrial democracies, not merely the destruction of the target area.

Two months later, in a curious rejoinder, Tucker dismissed the accumulation of military objections to his initial proposals without ever addressing the central question whether the use of force against the Arab oil producers would achieve the policy purposes of the United States:

...there must be a stronger case than one consisting of such points as the narrowness of the Straits of Hormuz, the smallness of the Persian Gulf and the prospect that it would be mined, the desert environment in which forces would operate, the need to provide a steady flow of supplies by sea and air, etc. Basic lectures on geography, climate, the nature of sea and air operations, and the elements of logistics might be useful for the general public. They scarcely dispose of the matter at hand.²

Tucker's question was answered indirectly in August 1975 when the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations released a "feasibility study" entitled *Oil Fields as Military Objectives*. The authors, John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, concluded that "successful operations would be assured *only* if this country could satisfy all aspects of a five-part mission:

- o Seize required oil installations intact.
- o Secure them for weeks, months, or years.

¹"Oil: The Issue of American Intervention," p. 27.

²Robert M. Tucker, "Further Reflections on Oil and Force," *Commentary*, March 1975, p. 53.

- o Restore wrecked assets rapidly.
- o Operate all installations without the owner's assistance.
- o Guarantee safe overseas passage for supplies and petroleum products."¹

The two analysts concluded that "military operations to rescue the United States (much less its key allies) from an airtight oil embargo would combine high costs with high risks." The related question whether forceful seizure of the Arabian oil fields was the only military option available to the United States was probably beyond the terms of reference of the study requested from the Congressional Research Service. But in a broader setting the question was worth asking: Were there no other ways to compel the oil-exporting nations to terminate an embargo than the dubious threat of occupying the oil fields?

Excessive confidence in the use of force in situations such as the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 is also exemplified by an irate book published in 1975 by three distinguished scholars, Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildawsky of the University of California at Berkeley, who stated bluntly:

In a different diplomatic context the task would have been easy enough--a division would have been more than sufficient to occupy Libya or any of the Persian Gulf states. Taken in conjunction with Israeli moves toward Cairo, the threat alone might have served. Saying that the days of gunboat diplomacy are over is no answer.²

The 1973-1974 oil embargo raised novel military and political problems that could neither be solved nor circumvented by rhetoric. In the years since the end of World War II, Western strategic analysts have

¹ Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, *Oil Fields as Military Objectives--A Feasibility Study*, Washington, D.C., 1975, p. xi.

² Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildawsky, *The Great Détente Disaster--Oil and the Decline of American Foreign Policy*, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975, pp. 63-64.

developed and refined doctrines for nuclear war, for large-scale conventional war, and for counterinsurgency, but "gunboat diplomacy" or, to use a less pejorative term, "coercive diplomacy," has been ignored, perhaps because it evokes the discredited practices of the Age of Imperialism. The three Berkeley professors had no concrete proposals on how "gunboat diplomacy" should be used. Perhaps they even failed to understand the technical complexities in using force for the achievement of limited political or economic objectives in the contemporary international environment:

Gunboat diplomacy, with all the term conjures by way of reckless and feckless nineteenth-century adventurism, is said not to work in a world whose nearly all societies have been "socially mobilized." The gaping natives who once watched with passive wonderment the approach of Western military engines are extinct.... It is not only that local populations, activated and inspired by nationalism, now have will and strength enough to resist such undertakings; but a new kind of moral disapprobation now lurks in our consciences, particularly when the sheer contrast between our evident physical might and the relative weakness of an adversary makes the contest seem unequal and "therefore," unjust. Herein lies a contradiction: if the contest really is unequal, then why cannot the gunboat actually do its job?¹

The simplistic question, "Why cannot the gunboat actually do its job?" does not lend itself to slick answers. Obviously a Third World country that is a member of the United Nations and may enjoy the political support of more than a hundred other countries as well as military assistance from various sources cannot be coerced the way a 19th century traditional society used to be, isolated from the rest of the world as well as militarily weak and politically fragile.

Nevertheless, a superpower like the United States might be able to translate its military superiority into political advantage if it had a clear conception of how to use force effectively in various circumstances, in other words, a military doctrine for the implementation of coercive diplomacy and the political will to apply it.

¹*The Great Détente Disaster*, pp. 63-64.

FORCE AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

A high degree of confidence that an intended operation can be successful is a prerequisite for a rational decisionmaker to want to use force. The National Command Authority would want to select the options most likely to succeed yet least likely to produce unintended adverse consequences, such as heavy military or civilian casualties, disproportionate costs, negative political reactions at home and in countries that are not directly involved, protracted conflict, excessive destruction, escalation, and intervention by other powers.

In a political-military operation with limited objectives much more than when the purpose is the destruction and elimination of an enemy, ends and means are inextricably mixed. In total war, seeking the unconditional surrender of the enemy or his complete destruction, victory is to be achieved "by any means." By contrast, in coercive diplomacy it is essential to select means which are appropriate to the ends pursued and are therefore limited, well-defined, and predicated on the continued existence and performance of the erstwhile adversary, after his initially antagonistic position has, under pressure, turned into willingness to cooperate.

The literature on the limited use of force for political purposes under contemporary circumstances is not extensive, but a few recent historic and analytic studies are available and cast much needed light on this complex problem.

A British diplomat, James Cable, published in 1971 under the auspices of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a study on "gunboat diplomacy," which he defined narrowly as the "recent and future applications of limited naval force as one of the instruments of foreign policy."¹ Cable distinguished "gunboat diplomacy" as an act of "coercive diplomacy," which is "intended to obtain some specific advantage from another state," from "acts of war," which are "the use of force against or in a foreign state for the primary purpose of injuring that state."²

¹James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, p. 9.

²*Gunboat Diplomacy*, p. 20.

Alexander L. George of Stanford University, with David K. Hall and William R. Simons, published in the same year a book on coercive diplomacy that did not distinguish between naval and other instruments of military power but examined the characteristics of one particular mode of using force, among a number of different general strategies:

The coercive strategy focuses upon affecting the enemy's will rather than upon negating his capabilities. It does not rely on ample or quick use of force to achieve political objectives. Rather, if threats alone do not suffice and force is actually used, it is employed in a more limited, selective manner than in the quick decisive strategy. That is, force is used in an exemplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments, to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict.... Hence force is subordinated to what is essentially not a military strategy at all but rather a political-diplomatic strategy for resolving or reconciling a conflict of interests with the opponent.¹

In analyzing the use of force for the achievement of political-military goals, George et al. found it useful to think in terms of

a continuum in which deterrence may be attempted before the opponent has initiated an action, and coercive diplomacy employed afterwards either to persuade him merely to halt or to undo his action.²

Going one important step further, beyond the defensive use of force, coercive diplomacy "may also be used offensively to get the opponent to do something he has not done and does not want to do." But coercive diplomacy does not rely solely on pure coercion: "it includes the possibility of bargains, negotiations, and compromises as well as coercive threats."³

¹Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, p. 18.

²*The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 24.

³*The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 25.

Finally, George et al. point out that one can distinguish between two basic variants of coercive strategy, the "try-and-see approach" or weak variant, in which military action is taken one step at a time, without creating a sense of urgency, and the "tacit-ultimatum" or strong variant in which one communicates to the opponent that military pressure on him will be increased until he complies.

On the basis of three historical case studies, the 1960-1961 Laos crisis, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1964-1965 Vietnam intervention, George and his associates concluded that eight conditions had all to be present to make confident use of the strategy of coercive diplomacy:

1. Strength of U.S. motivation.
2. Asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States.
3. Clarity of American objectives.
4. Sense of urgency to achieve the American objectives.
5. Adequate domestic political support.
6. Usable military options.
7. Opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation.
8. Clarity on the precise terms of settlement.

The authors conclude that in the Cuban and Laos crises all eight were present, whereas in the 1965 Vietnam case there were only the first and the sixth.¹

For this essay I will single out the requirement for "usable military options." The other seven conditions are essentially political; it would be impossible to even speculate how the goals of the adversaries, the political will of the leadership, and national cohesion and popular support would operate in a concrete future crisis. Usable military options are an entirely different matter. George et al. distinguish between "gross military capabilities" and "usable options" and comment:

¹*The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 216.

The United States possesses ample gross military capabilities to do various kinds of damage to a variety of targets. The requirements for usable options, however, are more stringent than this and often difficult to satisfy in practice. For military capabilities to be usable in a crisis which the president wishes to manage carefully, he must be satisfied that they will do the job in the way he thinks appropriate or necessary--i.e., in a controlled, discriminating manner.¹

When Tucker recommended that the United States occupy Arabian oil fields and take over the production and export of petroleum in order to break the OPEC cartel, he was not offering a usable military option. Arab countermeasures could have easily defeated the purpose of the operation, which was an act of war, aimed at destroying Arab states. It should have been an act of coercive diplomacy, aimed at liberating the industrial democracies from OPEC's stranglehold. To be usable, a military option must coerce the adversary to do what, if left undisturbed, he would be unwilling to do. The pressure might be exerted indirectly but effectively (in terms of its results) rather than directly and ineffectively. The oil fields may well have been the least lucrative target for military operations.

The selection of targets and the precise form of applying force to achieve the goals of coercive diplomacy are not a simple matter. The Vietnam war is a tragic reminder that, contrary to American expectations, air power as used from 1965 to 1972 did not succeed either in breaking the will of the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party or in destroying the morale of the population of North Vietnam.

Another valid analytic distinction--between use of "definitive force" and "purposeful force"--was made in Cable's study. He gave two examples in which naval force was used for a very specific purpose: the liberation of British prisoners of war from the German ship *Altmark* in Norwegian territorial waters in February 1940, and the seizure of the *Pueblo* off the coast of North Korea in January 1968. The two episodes illustrate what Cable means by the use of "definitive force":

¹*The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 225.

A government embarking on an act of genuinely limited force should thus have a reasonable expectation that the force initially employed will be sufficient to achieve the specific purpose originally envisaged without regard to the reactions of the victim, whose options are thus confined to acquiescence or a retaliation which can only follow, and not prevent, the achievement of the desired result. In such cases the use of force is not merely limited, but also definitive: it creates a *fait accompli*.¹

Although Cable considers the *Altmark* and the *Pueblo* classic cases of gunboat diplomacy, this mode of using limited force, whether naval or other, does not seem to belong to the class of actions which can be defined as coercive diplomacy. Force was used to achieve a very specific result. Once the forceful act was completed, the government did not continue to exert pressure on the target country to perform certain acts in the future or desist from others.

The use of "definitive force" in Cable's terms would only be useful in situations like the *Mayaguez* or Entebbe incidents. The U.S. ship *Mayaguez* and its crew were liberated, but the firm American response to the capture of that ship neither changed the character of U.S.-Khmer Rouge relations nor did it guarantee the future safety of navigation off the coast of Cambodia. The Israeli raid on Entebbe liberated hostages, but did not put an end to the taking of hostages by Palestinian terrorists.

Effective coercive diplomacy should create a new situation, not just a *fait accompli*. Its results should last beyond the moment when force was applied, by modifying the relationship between the governments involved. For this mode of using limited force, Cable chose the term "purposeful force":

Limited naval force is employed purposefully in order to change the policy or character of a foreign government or of some organized group whose relationship to the assailant is, for practical purposes, substantially that of a foreign government. In its purposeful application force does not

¹*Gunboat Diplomacy*, p. 29.

itself do anything: it induces someone else to take a decision which would not otherwise have been taken: to do something or to stop doing it or to refrain from a contemplated course of action.¹

What Cable calls "purposeful force" is indeed coercive diplomacy:

The most direct application of purposeful force is to the leaders of the victim state or organization. They may be induced by personal threats or violence to take the desired decisions or they may be removed and replaced by others able and willing to do so.²

Coercion need not take the form of direct action against the members of foreign governments as individuals. Indeed, Cable notes that "the political developments of recent decades have been unfavorable to the use of foreign limited force against governments as opposed to their states."³ Modern states are not too dependent on individuals; if one set of leaders is removed, another will take its place. Nowadays, coercion is more likely to take the form of "damage infliction, which need not be directly related to the actual cause of the dispute." Its naval implementation, which was the sole object of Cable's inquiry, can take the form of blockades, harassment of shipping, the capture or sinking of vessels flying the victim's flag, coastal bombardments, and so forth. Having made his point, Cable then added a very significant comment:

In the nineteenth century, when a fleet at sea was almost invulnerable to anything but a stronger fleet, the use of limited naval force for damage infliction often allowed an assailant to put pressure on his victim with impunity, but both political and technological developments have since impaired the effectiveness of this expedient.⁴

¹ *Gunboat Diplomacy*, p. 39.

² *Gunboat Diplomacy*, p. 40.

³ *Gunboat Diplomacy*, p. 41.

⁴ *Gunboat Diplomacy*, pp. 42-43.

Cable rightly concluded that in today's altered environment, it is not easy to coerce a weaker adversary, as the United States found both in its confrontation with North Korea over the capture of the *Pueblo* and in the Vietnam war, which started as an unsuccessful attempt to use "purposeful force," or coercive diplomacy, by inflicting enough damage on the North to compel it to cease and desist fomenting insurgency in the South.

LESSONS FROM 215 PAST INCIDENTS

The effectiveness of using force as a political instrument has been studied in considerable detail in a 1971 report prepared by The Brookings Institution. The authors, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, defined rigorously the concept under investigation to decide which instances of military activity by the armed forces of the United States should be included in their study:

A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.¹

Blechman and Kaplan identified 215 incidents in which the United States used its armed forces for political objectives between January 1, 1946, and October 31, 1975. They then selected a random sample of 33 incidents (15 percent of the full set) for "systematic and rigorous analysis of outcomes." Eight specialists were commissioned to prepare 17 case studies, describing in some detail "U.S. objectives, the instruments of policy directed at those objectives, the character of the situation...and most importantly, the outcome of the situation."²

¹Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976, p. I-4 (mimeo).

²*The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, p. I-7.

At the end of their lengthy study, which gave detailed information that had not been previously available to the general public, Blechman and Kaplan concluded:

By and large, the demonstrative and discrete use of the armed forces for political objectives should not be an option which decisionmakers turn to frequently, nor quickly, to secure political objectives abroad, except under very special circumstances. We have found that over the longer term these uses of the armed forces are not an effective foreign policy instrument; decision-makers should not expect such uses of the armed forces to be able to serve as viable substitutes for broader and more fundamental policies; policies tailored to the realities of politics abroad, and incorporating diplomacy and the many other potential instruments available to U.S. foreign policy.

We have found, however, that in particular circumstances, demonstrative uses of the armed forces can sometimes be an effective way--at least in the short term--of securing U.S. objectives and preventing foreign situations inimical to U.S. interests from worsening more rapidly than more fundamental policies can be formulated. Thus, at times, and although decisionmakers should view these options with some caution, the demonstrative use of the armed forces for political objectives is a useful step to shore up a situation sufficiently so that more extreme adverse consequences can be avoided, so that domestic and international pressures for more forceful and perhaps counter-productive actions can be avoided, and so that time can be gained for sounder policies that can deal adequately with the realities of the situation to be formulated and implemented.¹

Traditionally, gunboat diplomacy has been employed to protect economic interests.² In the 1980s, some American interests that require protection by military force are likely to be either economic or other private concerns of American citizens. This opens up interesting possibilities. The Vietnam war was the result of a clash of political interests that were by their very nature not negotiable. No coalition government could have been formed in South Vietnam after 1965 that included both Communists and anti-Communists. It was irrational to

¹*The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, p. XVI-15-16.

²*Gunboat Diplomacy*, p. 79.

expect peace through national reconciliation rather than by the victory of one side. By contrast, economic and other nonpolitical disputes are normally amenable to bargaining. The success of trade unionism once it achieved legal status, social cohesion, and economic staying power is a good example. The rise of the labor movement did not result in the destruction of the capitalist system, contrary to the class war expectations of Marxism, because redistribution of income could be achieved in varying proportions and in many ways within the setting of market economies. The North-South conflict could intensify for a number of years and create sharp international crises, but the conflicting interests are by their nature reconcilable. The international economic order would not benefit from the destruction of either side in the mounting confrontation, unlike political conflicts in which opposing incompatible philosophies and ways of life result in civil wars.

In the coming decade, the United States may have to be capable of using coercive diplomacy to protect its interests during the transitional crisis between the present and some future international economic order. The issues in dispute do not require the complete defeat or total destruction of either North or South, even though the reconciliation of conflicting demands will be a slow and costly process during which the United States will have to modulate its responses to the demands of the other side by a skillful mix of across the table bargaining and coercive diplomacy.

The other class of threats to the world order raises different and difficult questions resulting from the incapacity of international organizations to provide efficient "management systems" for global problems such as population pressure, scarcity and uneven distribution of food, misuse of natural resources, environmental degradation, unemployment, and pathological urbanization. These phenomena could generate in the coming decade explosive social tensions resulting in riots and in extreme cases even in wide-scale Malthusian massacres. Beyond such outbursts of violence, there might be a general increase in unilateral international action, including illegal mass migrations that dwarf the influx of Mexicans into the United States, diversion of water resources in border areas, deliberate transfer of pollution downwind to foreign countries, "poaching" in the 200-mile "exclusive economic zone" of

ocean waters that coastal states are currently claiming, forceful competition for the exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed, extortion for transit rights through straits or air space for which recent demands by Vietnam for "payment" for overflights from Hong Kong to Bangkok may form a precedent, and other attempts to derive economic benefits in flagrant disregard of international rules.

In such instances, it might become necessary for the United States to respond unilaterally by using force as an instrument of coercive diplomacy, and Blechman and Kaplan's conclusions provide valuable guidance. Force may have to be used to prevent situations inimical to U.S. interests from worsening until long-term solutions can be formulated, negotiated, and implemented through other instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

There are lessons to be learned from the age of gunboats, even though technology and the political climate of our times have created a situation different from that in the century before the 1970s. Cable points out that the emergence of nationalism and the achievement of state sovereignty will make armed intervention more difficult in the future because popular resistance is now much more easily mobilized than during the past age of Western dominance. Furthermore, the establishment of the United Nations and the rapidity and wide diffusion of international communications have increased the ability of a coerced country and its friends to enlist global public opinion against its adversary. This will have an inhibiting effect on governments sensitive to moral values, even if the United Nations is incapable of providing peaceful practical conflict-solving methods.

But if international anarchy and chaos prevail in the 1980s, political constraints on the use of force may be less restraining than the technological factors that now operate in favor of the defense. Electronic means of reconnaissance and detection can nullify the traditional ability of warships to appear suddenly and attack by surprise. The spread of modern weapons can make it risky for a power wishing to use coercion to apply pressure by establishing an offshore presence "allowing the looming menace of visible warships time to fray the nerves of those ashore," as Cable describes the strategy once used by maritime

powers.¹ That mode of operation may no longer be possible in future instances of coercive diplomacy:

In war--or so we are assured--a properly trained and equipped fleet would be immune from anything so simple and inexpensive as a flotilla of Komar boats; in the peculiar conditions of gunboat diplomacy these could be a menace to warships more numerous and far more powerful.¹

In the light of this caveat, what forms of military power should the United States have available for coercive diplomacy? Is sea power still suitable for military action against a foreign country in non-belligerent situations, when only limited objectives are sought? According to the Geographer of the Department of State, in 1969 108 sovereign states, some 15 dependencies and areas of associated sovereignty, and a highly diverse assortment of islands faced or were surrounded by the sea, whereas only 28 states were landlocked.²

In past conflicts of economic interests between unequal powers, a naval blockade could influence the outcome of a dispute decisively if one party had superior naval power and the other was vulnerable because of its dependence on sea communications. The blockading power found it often politically and morally advantageous to resort only to measures short of actual combat, avoiding loss of lives and extensive damage to property.

Laurence W. Martin argued 10 years ago that blockades were still useful in bargaining--the "cautious pursuit of a dispute," to use his words. They can serve initially the function of symbolic action but, if sustained, they can sap the overall strength of a nation and force it to yield to superior power. Because of the gradual nature of its impact, a blockade is, according to Martin, "particularly suitable for bringing pressure to bear in a nonbelligerent manner":

There are apparently a number of reasons for this. One is that a blockade can operate at a distance from the victim's

¹ *Gunboat Diplomacy*, p. 79.

² U.S. Department of State, *Sovereignty of the Sea*, Geographic Bulletin No. 3, revised October 1969, p. 4.

home territory and may therefore avoid the appearance of constituting an immediate threat to the core of his power and independence. By the same token it poses no direct danger to the safety of his people; it chiefly concerns naval personnel and those few citizens who happen to be seamen.¹

After the Cuban missile crisis, the success of the American blockade gave much encouragement to those who saw in such operations "weapons of potentially general application for bargaining purposes."² According to Martin, the Berlin Task Force set up in Washington "reputedly conceived of some two dozen different types of maritime pressure that might be employed." This led him to remark tartly that "faith, if not wholly misplaced, is in danger of going too far."³ If such caution was valid 10 years ago, it is much more pertinent today.

The maritime power of the Soviet Union has grown considerably in the interval. Unassisted, a country without defenses against naval action may be effectively coerced by a maritime power. But if the Soviet Union chose to help the blockaded country by making available merchant ships under Soviet flag, escorted by Soviet naval vessels, this would create a different situation. Acts of war such as the mining of Haiphong in 1972 might be required to enforce a blockade.

THE ADVENT OF PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS

A protracted debate is under way on the vulnerability of carrier task groups to conventionally armed missiles launched from fast patrol boats, land-based aircraft, helicopters, submarines, or shore installations. The diffusion of precision-guided weapons is bound to increase the risks in using multi-billion dollar weapon systems against targets protected by these sophisticated new weapons. Third World countries may have precision-guided weapons in their inventories by the 1980s, or may be able to obtain them on short notice from the Soviet Union if

¹L. W. Martin, *The Sea in Modern Strategy*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967, pp. 151, 153.

²*The Sea in Modern Strategy*, p. 161.

³*The Sea in Modern Strategy*, p. 162.

a serious confrontation with the United States or other industrial democracy were to develop. Unlike the development of a decisive strategic nuclear capability, the use of such weapons would require neither capital investments in the multi-billion dollar range nor a broad and sophisticated national technological base. A country rich enough in natural resources to incite the United States to engage in coercive diplomacy may have the foreign exchange required for the acquisition of a defensive capability against sea power based on precision-guided weapons.

Target acquisition within a 100 to 200 mile range could be achieved, especially under the relatively static conditions of a naval blockade, by aircraft and helicopter; within a horizon range of 15 to 25 miles, acquisition could be made by land- or sea-based radar, or by information collected by submarine sonar.¹

My Rand colleague James Digby has estimated that precision-guided weapons, mass-produced in the next couple of decades, will cost \$1000 to \$10,000 per round and that average soldiers will be able to operate many of them:²

The \$100-million cruiser, \$500-thousand tank and \$10-million fighter will be challenged by the proliferation of less expensive weapons. Most are light enough to be moved easily, and many operate with almost no set-up time.³

In the slow-moving setting of a naval blockade, the country subjected to coercive diplomacy would have ample time to concentrate its defenses or even to acquire a capability that it previously lacked, if the Soviet Union or some other country is willing to air deliver precision-guided weapons. In such circumstances, the United States may not find it cost effective to place at risk high-value naval vessels. By the 1980s, sea power may no longer be usable as an instrument

¹ Gordon Lee, "Sea Power: A Survey of the Royal Navy," *The Economist*, March 3, 1973.

² James Digby, *Precision-Guided Weapons*, Adelphi Papers, No. 118, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975, p. 4.

³ *Precision-Guided Weapons*, p. 8.

of coercive diplomacy, a development not anticipated by Cable and Martin, who wrote before the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war focused attention on precision-guided weapons.

There is naturally a time lag between the appearance of a major technological innovation and its full effect on military doctrine and force posture decisions. The implications of this latest technological military revolution, however, are being gradually recognized by professional military and civilian strategic analysts. In a recent article, Vice-Admiral George P. Steele, a submariner who retired in 1975 after commanding the 7th Fleet, voiced his belief that the large and very expensive surface ships that the U.S. Navy continues to favor "are in great danger from both submarines and surprise missile attacks."

A 1970 worldwide Soviet Navy exercise showed convincingly--according to Admiral Steele--that scores of missiles could be launched simultaneously against aircraft carriers and other ships:

It looked like another Pearl Harbor attack--but against forces underway at sea instead of moored in port. Once missiles are launched in such numbers, U.S. Navy aircraft carrier groups as now constituted have no adequate defense against them.¹

Admiral Steele suggested that with presently structured U.S. sea forces and programmed purchases, "our teeth are drawn, except when we take on a lesser power, with the assent of the Soviet Union."¹ But as long as the Soviet Union has global ambitions, it will be tempted to extend its influence by helping Third World countries against which the United States may want to use limited naval force as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. Under the circumstances, conventional naval power may no longer be practical for coercive diplomacy missions. The Soviet Union could challenge an American blockade and force the United States to choose between attacking ships under the Soviet flag and abandoning its limited objectives. The United States will have to develop new

¹George P. Steele, "A Fleet to Match Our Real Needs," *The Washington Post*, May 16, 1976 (emphasis added).

concepts, doctrines and methods, and possibly also new weapon systems to use military force as a political instrument.

Revolutions in military technology, like any other drastic form of social change, are not easily assimilated by professionals tied by institutional loyalties, personal memories, group pressure, and intellectual habit to doctrines and weapon systems which are becoming obsolete. Furthermore, although the notion is gradually gaining acceptance, the evidence is still ambiguous that the advent of precision-guided weapons, together with high-performance means of reconnaissance and surveillance, are creating an entirely different environment for the operations of surface vessels.

The 17th annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, held in September 1975, did not achieve a consensus on the future role of "Power at Sea." An influential Australian strategist, Hedley Bull, then of the Australian National University at Canberra and now of Oxford University, argued in a keynote address on "Sea Power and Political Influence" that the classical use of sea power as an instrument of diplomacy by superpowers against weaker coastal states may not be possible in the future, not only because of changed political circumstances but also for military reasons:

The coastal states, moreover, will in many cases have the military power to withstand threats directed at them, at least when these threats are made in their own home waters and by naval means alone. It is now widely argued that the short-range and surface-to-surface missile, directed at ships from the shore or from small combatant vessels, poses a threat to which no response is available at an acceptable cost, as was demonstrated in the sinking of the *Hilath* in 1967 and the Pakistani vessels in 1971. In 1973 it was estimated that more than three dozen navies either possessed or had ordered such anti-ship missiles to be deployed on small combatant vessels...it would be wrong to assume that weak coastal states will continue to afford the great naval powers the kind of sanctuary enjoyed by American naval forces during the Vietnam war, or to imagine that a coastal state, if directly threatened, would necessarily feel the same inhibitions about attacking the ships of a great power that the great powers feel in relation to one another. Thus it seems quite possible

that, if the *Enterprise* task force had actually attacked India in 1971, Indian anti-ship missiles might have tried to sink it.¹

A distinguished British military historian, Michael Howard of Oxford University, offered the conference a different view on the prospects for aircraft carriers. Discussing the future of naval warfare in the 1980s, he asserted:

Maximally effective fire power no longer depends on heavy guns or manned aircraft which, in their turn, depend on massive floating platforms--battleships or aircraft carriers. The long-range precision-guided missile operated from small craft or even from submarines has introduced a radically new element into the situation. The manner and extent to which naval warfare has been transformed is still difficult to foresee. Those who use the analogy of the victory of the longbowmen over the French heavy cavalry at Crecy should remember that heavy cavalry remained indispensable on the battlefield for centuries after the longbow had been relegated to military museums. The continuing value of the aircraft carrier in, for example, projecting power from sea to land, appears self-evident.²

Howard cautioned the members of the International Institute for Strategic Studies against expecting major changes in the global balance of power as the result of the diffusion of precision-guided weapons:

It has been further suggested that these technological developments, by calling the whole concept of naval superiority into question, will greatly increase the power of small states; that the missile, especially the precision-guided missile, will be the great equalizer and therefore work for the benefit of the Third World. This is a claim that must be treated with caution. Firearms, like any other weapon, are of use only to those who can afford to buy them and are trained to use them. One needs to know

¹ Hedley Bull, "Sea Power and Political Influence," *Power at Sea--I. The New Environment*, Adelphi Papers, No. 122, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976, p. 8.

² Michael Howard, "Order and Conflict at Sea in the 1980s," *Power at Sea--III. Competition and Conflict*, Adelphi Papers, No. 124, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976, p. 5.

not only what new weapons the technologists have in store for us, but how much they are going to cost. We are witnessing today the navies of the wealthy European powers shrinking dangerously as technological change prices them almost out of the market. The cost factor will rigorously limit the number of Third World states which can avail themselves of the fruits of the new technology.¹

Digby's cost estimates for precision-guided munitions cast doubt on the validity of this conclusion. At \$1000 a round, even relatively poor Third World countries could acquire an impressive low-cost defense capability against naval combatants. Furthermore, the growing solidarity of Third World countries could create entirely new global power relations in future confrontations with the industrial democracies. The richest oil-exporting countries can afford sophisticated weapons and are spending billions on acquisition programs which will stretch into the 1980s. This military potential could be made available by the leading OPEC states to their less affluent comrades-in-arms, especially if countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran were to come under the control of radical-nationalist governments similar to that of Colonel al-Qadhafi in Libya.

THE FUTURE ROLE OF MANNED AIRCRAFT

An assessment of the future effectiveness of coercive diplomacy does not depend primarily on the vulnerability of aircraft carriers to new weapon systems but on whether it will be possible to use air power to coerce an adversary to act in a certain way, without excessive costs to the attacker and without damaging the enemy's economic assets more than is strictly necessary to obtain a favorable resolution of the conflict. Will it be possible to select targets and develop operational patterns that will compel foreign governments to sell oil, grant free passage through narrow straits, extend full legal protection to American citizens and corporations, and even abstain from being beastly to their own populations and neighbors?

Whether they are carrier-based or land-based, manned aircraft would have to be used for coercive diplomacy, as such operations require greater

¹"Order and Conflict at Sea in the 1980s," p. 6.

precision than conventional war fighting. Blechman and Kaplan, after analyzing 33 incidents in which U.S. armed forces were used as a political instrument, concluded that "the type of force most closely associated with positive outcomes was land-based combat aircraft."¹ They stated in their conclusions:

Clearly, the Air Force is an instrument which could be used expeditiously and flexibly for political objectives. What is required is an examination of whether additional equipment or procedural changes might be desirable so as to enhance the potential Air Force role in political operations, and an examination of situations world-wide so as to determine in which potential crises there would be facilities suitable to base Air Force combat squadrons. Following such a study, U.S. contingency planning might be reviewed so as to determine whether the effectiveness of the armed forces as political instruments might be enhanced by substituting land-based air force units for naval forces in certain situations.²

The study conducted by The Brookings Institution was based on the analysis of incidents that occurred before October 1975. Whether they are still valid in the age of precision-guided weapons remains to be determined by future studies.

Conceptual thinking on the role of air power, whether land-based or sea-based, may be lagging behind technological developments and geopolitical requirements. A 1964 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, Major Dennis W. Stiles, wrote in a recent article:

Although the borders between ideas, concepts, principles, and doctrine are vague, the broad function of doctrine is to crystallize, not energize, to incorporate compacted complexities, not slice through them to provocative visions. In spite of the attention to doctrine, visionary energy in the Air Force declined after World War II....

One upshot of the limitations of doctrine joined with a perpetually stronger appreciation for complexity, nuance,

¹*The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, p. VI-39.

²*The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, p. XVI-13.

and interrelationship is a marked erosion of prophetic conceptual thinking. Nowhere in the Air Force do we see a bold, bubbling fountain of fresh ideas. In the field of concepts the Air Force has become a status-quo institution, feeling middle age and inclined to rephrase proven formulas.¹

A retired naval aviator who believes that "carrier-based attack aircraft now represent the paramount means of applying naval force against an enemy" expressed similar misgivings. In an article entitled "Is Tac Air Dead?" Captain Gerald G. O'Rourke admits evenhandedly that both the Navy and the Air Force are acquiring good new tactical aircraft: "In combat, they will fly a bit longer, farther, higher, and faster than their predecessors, carrying fewer, but smarter bombs, rockets, and missiles."² But he sees no comparable progress in the adaptation of doctrine to changing circumstances:

It is not the aircraft themselves, not even their astronomical costs that are knocking Tac Air all akilter. Instead, it is the basic philosophy concerning just how they will be used in combat. If Tac Air's historical precedents are followed, the F-14s, F-15s, and F-16s will first take on the enemy's fighters to establish air superiority. Then the F-18s, A-10s, and most of the fighters will lug bombs and rockets to pulverize ground targets. That seems to be the plan. It worked in World War II, in Korea, in Vietnam, and in the Middle East. Ergo, it will work the next time, too.

Maybe.

Maybe not.³

Neither of these two articles discussed how air power could be used effectively for coercive diplomacy.

¹Major Dennis W. Stiles, "Air Power: A New Look from an Old Roof-top," *Air University Review*, November-December 1975, p. 52.

²Captain Gerald G. O'Rourke, U.S. Navy (Ret.), "Is Tac Air Dead?" *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, October 1976, p. 37.

³"Is Tac Air Dead?" p. 38.

Civilian strategic analysts are equally conservative. A 1974 study on U.S. tactical air power, published by The Brookings Institution, is a conventional discussion of the tactical air mission roster. It does not raise the question whether the U.S. Air Force might be required to perform new missions in the future. Alternative tactical air programs are examined solely with regard to how traditional mission priorities could be reordered in response to rising unit costs of tactical aircraft. The author, William D. White, concludes:

Some changes in prevailing doctrine may be unavoidable as it becomes simply too expensive to buy in any substantial quantity aircraft with the performance characteristics needed to carry out the demanding missions the services consider vital.¹

Whether the missions considered vital by the services will be the only important ones for the future defense of U.S. national interests is not discussed.

The class of threats exemplified by the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 has no precedent in American military experience. During the post-war decades of American global preeminence, we seemed to think that U.S. interests could only be harmed through direct military action by the Soviet Union and its satellites. How to cope with those threats was well treated in the doctrine guiding national security policy. The most current USAF basic doctrine is based on the premise that the "primary objective of U.S. national security is deterrence of *military actions* which are counter to U.S. interests."² Deterrence by military power of nonmilitary actions detrimental to U.S. interests and, were deterrence to fail, credible means of coercion for the termination of those hostile nonmilitary actions are not explicitly addressed in the basic doctrine.

¹ William D. White, *U.S. Tactical Air Power: Mission, Forces, and Costs*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974, p. 101.

² Lt. General John W. Pauly, USAF, "The Thread of Doctrine," *Air University Review*, May-June 1976, p. 8 (emphasis added).

To prevent a doctrinal lag and prepare for new contingencies, it may be useful to review the requirements that coercive diplomacy may generate in the future. *United States Air Force Basic Doctrine* (AFM 1-1) stipulates in Chap. 3, "Aerospace Forces in Modern Conflict," Sec. 5, "Functions and Missions of Aerospace Forces":

The basic combat operational missions of aerospace forces are (this order is not intended to indicate priority):
(1) strategic attack; (2) counter air; (3) air interdiction; (4) close air support; (5) aerospace defense of the United States; (6) aerospace surveillance and reconnaissance; (7) airlift; and (8) special operations.¹

The class of missions considered here could perhaps be included under "Special Operations," which are defined in paragraph (h) of Sec. 3-5 as follows:

Aerospace special operations forces conduct counter-insurgency, psychological operations, unconventional warfare, and functions which may be considered adjuncts to or in support of various other operations. Aerospace special operations forces are organized, trained and equipped to conduct special operations at all levels of warfare. The flexibility, versatility, and low visibility of these forces are particularly suited to subtheater and localized conflicts. Also, special operations forces assist selected foreign nations in developing their capability in internal defense, internal security, nation building and civic action programs, and related activities.

Although coercive diplomacy missions may be viewed as a category of special operations, there are significant differences in the characteristics of these two ways of using air power. To compel an adversary to change certain policies detrimental to U.S. interests will require a different approach from operations which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, might seek primarily to "assist selected foreign nations."

As coercive diplomacy aims at influencing the will of an adversary, maximum visibility may be desirable. The psychological effect of

¹Department of the Air Force, *United States Air Force Basic Doctrine*, Air Force Manual AFM 1-1, January 15, 1975.

attacks on certain targets rather than merely the destruction of assets may be their primary purpose. Important in other instances, "low visibility" may be counter productive for coercive diplomacy operations.

The U.S. Air Force has always considered projection of power abroad an important part of its mission. In his presentation to the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on the FY 1977 Posture Statement, the Chief of Staff of the USAF, General David C. Jones, stated:

It has become almost a cliché that we will no longer "play the role of the world's policeman" and have accordingly reduced both the size and overseas deployments of our forces. However, experience and prudence suggest that, when vital national or allied interests are threatened overseas, we must maintain the capability to project United States power abroad to the degree necessary to protect those interests.¹

Projection of power abroad will always require a broad spectrum of capabilities. If coercive diplomacy becomes part of the regular cluster of missions, land-based long-range tactical aviation with the global mobility that a sophisticated air refueling capability will make increasingly possible² may have many advantages over surface naval vessels, such as speed, flexibility, freedom from bases, and cost effectiveness.

Precision-guided weapons and stand-off capability would permit careful selection of targets, thus avoiding unwanted collateral damage and costly combat operations for air superiority. Air power could then indeed carry out missions functionally equivalent to those of surface naval vessels in the days when maritime power reigned supreme.

¹ Department of the Air Force, *Presentation to the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Statement of General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, February 1976*, p. 18 (mimeo).

² General T. R. Milton, USAF (Ret.), "USAF: Global Mobility Means Global Utility," *Air Force Magazine*, September 1975, p. 66.